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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to determine how the influence of
funders (and other external support institutions) affect the development
priorities and strategies of community development corporations (CDCs).
CDCs were originally designed to allow community residents to make inde-
pendent development decisions based on their interpretation of community
needs. Potential problems arose when some CDC priorities were not
favored by funding institutions.
This paper examines studies of CDCs to see whether other analysts
find any conflict between community development corporations and their
funders. The thesis then presents case studies of three Boston based
(black controlled) CDCs and evaluates their involvement with support
institutions. The organizations examined are: The Lower Roxbury Devel-
opment Corporation; The Greater Roxbury Development Corporation; and
The Roxbury Action Program.
This study finds that CDCs in general aren't heavily pressured by
external support institutions to conform to a specific set of priorities.
However, private and public sector funders do help to limit the develop-
ment options available to community corporations. In addition, many
CDCs find that they must avoid strategies that appear too controversial
or political in nature. CDCs can resist much of the outside influence
by building strong (and effective) organizations, maintaining an in-
volved constituency, using volunteers and contact people, and pursuing
funding sources that offer the maximum flexibility. CDC should rely on
other community organizations (that are less dependent on external sup-
port) to work on more controversial projects.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Phillip Clay
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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5INTRODUCTION
6Since the late 1960s, many community based groups have evolved
from issue-oriented advocacy organizations into more professional devel-
opment corporations (CDCs). These corporations were established to in-
crease local control of resources and to bring about physical, social,
economic, and political changes that would improve the lives of low-income
and minority residents of distressed communities across the country. In
short, CDCs were to be independent citizen-controlled vehicles of change.
Much of the original impetus for the creation of CDCs came from a
vocal and sometimes militant desire of many communities to shape their
own development and create alternative institutions. In later years, CDCs
were promoted by some (mainstream) policy makers who preferred self-help
(neighborhood enterprises) to other programs in the federal government.
The promotion of independent community based development efforts has come
most recently from conservative analysts who like to see a great deal of
government program activity taken over by private corporations and local
self-help "mediating" structures. Supporters from different parts of the
political spectrum believe that the issue of independence from outside
control and regulation was (and is) important in local development.
Over the years, the initial dreams of CDC proponents have been tem-
pered by harsh realities confronting new development entities that had to
operate in communities plagued with poverty, unemployment, and an outflow
or withdrawal of financial resources. CDCs also found themselves battling
red tape and local governments that were often unsupportive of neighbor-
hood based development efforts. These organizations had to weather such
external or environmental constraints while trying to develop competent
7organizations and survive financially. Financial survival in almost all
cases meant soliciting funds from outside public and/or private sources.
Working with these external sources of support meant cooperating with
funding entities which could potentially challenge a corporation's wish
to operate as an independent community force.
The community development corporation's need to make independent
development decisions can potentially conflict with a funder's desire to
make sure that funds are used for purposes it (the funder) determines to
be appropriate. External support groups (funders) try to insure that
their funds are used wisely by imposing restrictions or regulations on the
aid they give to CDCs. "Strings" attached to resources given to organi-
zations tend to vary according to the type of funding body involved,
therefore providing community corporations with some options concerning
the types of support they can choose in their efforts to implement devel-
opment strategies.
CENTRAL THESIS QUESTIONS
In light of the issues discussed above, this thesis will attempt
to answer the following related questions:
- To what extent do external support institutions affect the
development of CDCs and their choice of organizational
priorities?
- Is the concept of independent community development a realiz-
able goal, given the constraints imposed on CDCs from the
external support environment?
- Or, how well can a CDC choose its own development priorities
in the face of outside influence of these support groups?
8METHOD OF INVESTIGATION
Measuring the impact of external support institutions on CDCs is
not an easy process because most community corporations interact with a
variety of public and private funders in the course of their development.
Furthermore, CDCs must obtain other resources (such as housing financing)
which do not directly support the organization, but still might allow the
CDC to be under pressure from outside agencies and actors. In light of
these complications, this study will investigate organizations with very
different funding histories to try and illustrate how a variety of support
groups can influence a CDC's development choices.
Three Boston-based CDCs will be examined to determine how well they
maintain their original development interests in the face of such external
(funding or support related) constraints, or alternatively, whether changes
in their priorities were clearly organizational responses to changing com-
munity needs. All three organizations began functioning as CDCs in the
late 1960s. These CDCs were initiated for different reasons, but they
all chose to try and develop some portion of Roxbury (one of Boston's
primary black neighborhoods), an area with a large low income population
with a range of problems associated with inner city areas.
The Lower Roxbury Community Corporation started out of community
efforts to stop the negative effects of urban renewal in the Madison Park
section of Lower Roxbury. The city planned to level an existing neigh-
borhood to make way for a large high school complex which was designed to
be a model of education in Boston. The residents of the area organized
to prevent the total destruction of their houses, and demanded that the
city scale down its school complex and set aside some land for replacement
housing. When the residents decided to try and develop the housing
9themselves, they ultimately formed a corporation, and became one of the
first CDCs in the country.
The Roxbury Action Program was originally a Quaker sponsored
housing advocacy group. The group became autonomous from its sponsors
and moved to the Highland Park section of Roxbury to begin an ambitious
set of development activities to try and create a "model Black Community"
in a badly deteriorated neighborhood. Since 1969 it has focused on
housing development and other projects in an attempt to try and accom-
plish its objectives.
The Greater Roxbury Development Corporation (initially Circle,
Inc.) is a Roxbury based organization working toward improvement in the
economic and physical condition of the greater Roxbury area. It received
federal funding and evolved into a Title VII CDC with a large staff and
more of a business emphasis than RAP or LRCC. (The name changed to GRDC
in 1975 in a process that will be described in Chapter IV.) Although
GRDC is no longer directly funded by the federal government, it had ten
years worth of experience in trying to implement its programs while
being financed primarily by one agency.
These three organizations are all basically black controlled CDCs
facing similar neighborhood conditions and negotiating with the same lo-
cal and state political forces. The organizations differ in origin, staff
size, priorities, strategies, and (what is most germaine to the study)
they also have different sources of funding. While GRDC has been almost
completely funded by the same public source over the years, RAP and LRCC
have pursued a more diverse public and private funding strategy. The con-
trasts between GRDC and the other two CDCs will help to illustrate the
ramifications of each kind of funding on an organization's development.
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The similarities of the CDCs allow us to isolate the key differ-
ences between them more easily. For example, the study will not be con-
cerned with the issue of funding impact in terms of different racial
groups, since all of the organizations now are generally representative
of the same group (although the question of the effects of racial back-
ground in a group's attempt to seek funding and venture capital would
probably be an interesting study). Our comparison will also not be ham-
pered by the questions that would arise if the CDCs were located in dif-
ferent cities. Since the three organizations exist under the same mayor,
governor, and local economy, these variables will not automatically
account for differences in organizational progress and strategy. (Rela-
tions between the individual organizations and government bodies, how-
ever, will be considered.)
Each CDC will be examined in terms of its background, organiza-
tional evolution, relation with funding sources, and both present and
future development strategies. The methodology employed for these case
studies included several interviews with people in some way connected
with these organizations, and an examination of any organizational docu-
ments that helped in assessing some of the basic questions under consid-
eration in this study. (See Appendix I for a further description of the
methodology.)
In addition to case studies of the three CDCs, this study will
survey a good portion of the (case study) literature on CDCs, their devel-
opment, and their relationship to funding and other external sources of
influence. Another set of information concerns the evolution of Title
VII CDCs and the changes that occurred within the federal administrative
agency that affected the client CDCs. Finally, some of the information
is not about actual physical development organizations, but other more
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human development groups that have also experienced some effects from
the funding environment. This study will be organized in the following
way:
Chapter I: Presents a survey of the literature on CDCs and their
overall effectiveness in the face of external constraints and internal
problems. Special focus will be given to the relations of community
groups to their funding sources. If most of the literature agrees on
particular points, then these issues will be clearly identified to see
whether the case studies done in this thesis agree with the assessments
of other researchers.
Chapter II: Contains the case study of the Lower Roxbury Develop-
ment Corporation. LRCC will be examined because it maintained a smaller
staff and didn't rely as heavily on outside resources than RAP or GRDC.
The group was also established with more of a voluntary effort than the
other two organizations. The case will determine whether this factor
is important to the central questions.
Chapter III: Presents a case study of the Roxbury Action Program.
RAP relied on a mix of private and public resources. The organization
falls somewhere in between LRCC and GRDC in terms of total funds re-
ceived, and, as this chapter will show, RAP's history and orientation is
different in many ways from the other groups.
Chapter IV: Examines the history of the Greater Roxbury Develop-
ment Corporation and its relationship with the Community Services Admin-
istration. The case is interesting since the organization was so heavily
dependent on federal funding. Discussions in Chapter I will provide suf-
ficient background to explain the development of the SIP/Title VII pro-
gram that sponsored and monitored this type of CDC. .
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Chapter V: Presents an analysis of the material from the survey
of literature and the case studies. The major task of this section is
to show the positive and negative effects of the funding environment. This
paper will explore the reasons for the effects, and whether the "indepen-
dence" of the CDCs is actually threatened by funding related influences.
Chapter V also examines other external factors relating to funding that
tend to change the direction and orientation of some CDCs.
Finally, Chapter V contains conclusions regarding some of the issues
vital to this study, and recommendations concerning the future role of
CDCs in their relations to funding and other potential sources of external
support.
13
CHAPTER I:
A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
14
Community Development Corporations (and other community based
organizations--CB~s) face an array of internal and external forces that
can alter their plans, priorities, and implementation strategies. A
study of CDCs done by the Urban Institute summarized these influences in
the following way:
We have distinguished three general classes of variables
which influence CDC resources, choices, and resultant
community outcomes:
1) national and metropolitan wide changes
2) external development support institutions
3) the organization and choices of CDCs themselvesl
These categories are simply stated but include a wide variety of factors
that help explain the evolution of CDCs. This thesis is specifically con-
cerned with actors, groups, and institutions that would be defined under
item #2. The first section of this chapter will discuss the general impact
of external "support" institutions, while the next section shall specifi-
cally examine the relationship between the Community Services Administra-
tion ( and its predecessor) and Title VII CDCs.*
One of the main issues (or controversies) surrounding the impact
of external actors on community development corporations (and other CBOs)
comes from the need for CDCs to act independently of outside pressure to
establish program priorities that they see as being essential to meet the
needs of their constituencies. This need for independence often runs
counter to the wishes of a sponsoring agency or funder. These external
support institutions often want greater accountability and control over
CDC activities so that their funds can be used wisely. The wisest and
best use of course usually reflects the priorities of the funding bodies
themsel ves.
* The reasons for studying Title VIIs are explained in the next section.
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While this desire for accountability (and propensity to regulate)
is understandable, some would argue that external "supports" have pushed
their influence too far. A complaint often heard is that "the rules under
which CDCs must operate in order to get federal funding drastically limit
their capacity for economic innovation. . . . the policy guidelines severely
limit the money available for other community projects, from non-profit
businesses to health care and recreation . . ." CDCs are forced to adapt
their own objectives to the priorities of funding entities because they
(the CDCs) often have no other more flexible support alternatives.
An earlier evaluation of a Boston community organization's efforts
pessimistically concluded that CDCs don't have very much control at all
over what their development priorities should be. 3 The study suggests
that this lack of choice occurs because:
. . much time is spent searching for additional government
funds or private support for different community projects.
This orientation makes it [the organization] susceptible to
changing their goals whenever there is a change in government
spending priorities . . .4
Once again this illustrates a kind of indirect control a funder can exert
over a client organization. While the support group didn't exactly tell
the CDC to change its goals, it severely limited the options available,
thus achieving much the same effect. Another study backs up this point:
. the CDC's range of choices may be constrained by the
requirement of those providing funds rather than by their
ability to identify alternative output mixes and produce
them. A possible solution, of course, is more discretion-
ary funding. 5
Some studies mentioned that a lot of groups valued support from
church related funds because their funding requirements were found to be
more flexible. Other CBOs tried to maintain diverse sources of funding so
they could more or less find support for a variety of priorities. However,
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even utilization of these approaches does not prevent a CDC from having
its strategy options limited at some point in its experience. For example,
Church related support might have been more flexible, but it did not come
in sufficient quantity, nor did it last very long in most cases, requiring
the use of more restrictive funding. Another problem arose because the
alternative approaches and philosophies expoused by some community based
groups often clashed with the social/political viewpoints of many other
funding institutions. "Traditional private sources, with few exceptions,
are particularly resistant to funding requests from neighborhood organiza-
tions seeking help for controversial activities essential to resident
capacity and neighborhood self-determination." 6
Even if CDCs don't suffer direct pressure from groups that fund
their staff operations, the nature of their work often necessitates the
use of federal and state housing (and other) programs which mean the
introduction of new constraints:
In their attempts to establish local housing conservation
programs, neighborhood organizations invariably discover
that their efforts are constrained by a frustrating, often
incomprehensible framework of laws, ordinances, codes,
regulations, and bureaucratic practices . . .7
Thus, individuals and agencies that are supposedly there to aid the efforts
of CDCs (often supplying indirect funding) also bring a new set of priorities
that are added to the wishes of CDC sponsors like CSA or the Ford Foundation.
CDCs are not the only community based groups that often suffer from
this kind of influence. Other studies complain about the restrictive
nature of federal human service programs. Conservative critics of govern-
ment regulation constantly argue against government interference. One
example of this comes from a case study of a youth home in Philadelphia
called the House of Umoja. The investigator concluded that "the need to
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conform to bureaucratic demands in the contract nearly tore the Umoja pro-
gram assunder."8 This study recommended that public policy "shouldn't
intervene directly in the operation of a local structure or otherwise
exercise control over its decision making." 9
Yet, a funding or sponsoring body can't allow all of its funds to
be totally unrestricted and still want some kind of accountability or
emphasis in its sponsorship. A public body with the "public interest"
has a desire (in theory anyway) to see that dollars are well spent. The
difficulty here, however, seems to be an overstepping of bounds that can
hamper efforts by the people most closely associated with the problems
of a particular locality who are supposed to have the best notion of what
to do in a particular area to improve local conditions.
This potential for excessive interference in CDC affairs is espe-
cially unsettling because much of the initial rhetoric coming from funders
and supporters promotes the kind of independent decision-making they even-
tually helped to constrain. While some of the regulations or guidelines
come from well-meaning bureaucrats, they nonetheless impose their projects
from without, indicating that many support groups are actually very unwill-
ing to give up control over the resources in question..10
The discussion so far has indicated that it is possible for the
goals of community organizations to conflict with the priorities of larger
funders. Another course of direct political influence comes from state
and especially local governments who frequently don't like the idea of
independent power bases operating in their territory. One study points
out that "City Hall usually prefers to exercise total control over the
federal, state, and local resources under its jurisdictions . . ." and
often considers neighborhood groups "as activist nuisances or even
18
political threats."11 Another examination of CDC-local government relations
concludes that since the capacity of City Halls to harm CDCs is so great,
it is usually in a CDC's best interest to cooperate with this local force.
A comprehensive overview of CDC activity echoed this point by stressing
that:
. . . community development corporations may be able to
get organized without much support or enthusiasm from
civic and state officials, but it is not likely that
they will be able to survive very long or accomplish
very much unless they mend their fences with the author-
ities and establish good working relations . . .12
However, this kind of cooperation (especially when the resources
in question are so political) almost always comes at a price which may
or may not be too steep for community residents to pay. One critical
study of a Boston CDC effort reported that the CDC in question was forced
to cooperate with the Redevelopment Authority in order to try and rehabil-
itate a number of units for low-moderate income residents even though the
Authority was in the process of displacing a substantially greater number
of lower income people elsewhere in the CDC's neighborhood. Apparently
this CDC was unable to participate in a protest oriented action against
the authority, causing its critics to question the worth of the compromise
since only a small fraction of the housing would be available for poor
and working class people.13
TITLE VII: A CLOSER LOOK AT EXTERNAL INFLUENCE
The previous discussion has outlined (through a survey of literature)
most of the general issues that will be covered by this report. In order
to examine the effects of external funders and support groups in a more
detailed way, this study will take a short look at the Title VII Special
Impact Program experience. Title VII will be examined primarily for three
reasons:
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1) There is a large amount of literature on the history and
evolution of Title VII.
2) Title VII CDCs receive as much as 90-95% of their funds from
the one agency operating the program. This dependency
would (at least in theory) make Title VIIs easier to examine
in terms of influences on them by a particular funder.
3) Chapter IV of this thesis is a case study of a former
Title VII CDC, so the discussion in this section will pro-
vide some background for that investigation.
The history of Title VII (or more accurately, its predecessor)
started in the mid 1960s. In its early days, Title VII was known as the
Special Impact Program or SIP. SIP refers to programs under the 1966
amendments of Title I-D of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.14 These
amendments came out of an effort by Sen. Robert Kennedy to help sponsor
a project that he was developing in New York City called Bedford Styvesant
Restoration Corporation, which became the first group funded as an SIP.
The early legislative language of the Special Impact Program has
been described as vague by many sources. A description of the legislation
illustrates this point:
Projects were to be designated "to arrest tendencies
toward dependency, chronic unemployment, and rising
community tensions. They were to be carried out in
poor neighborhoods themselves and they were to be of
sufficient size and scope to have an appreciable
impact. . . .15
The major intent of this non-specific kind of directive was to allow local
people to determine their own program priorities and types of operations.
The Special Impact Program suffered from political pressure from
its very beginning because the Johnson administration was reluctant to
support a Kennedy program. In 1968, the SIP was split between the Office
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of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the Department of Labor, the Commerce Depart-
ment, and the Department of Agriculture. In OE0 (where the program was
centered by 1969), the emphasis was on groups interested in economic
development under the control of local people 16 (although OEO was some-
what amenable to organizations with a broad development focus).
"In comparison to later years, OEG's early funding and technical
assistance to grantees focused heavily on organizational attributes such
as community representation, strong leadership, well developed political
,17clout at the local level, and broad participation." CDCs were to develop
their own goals for development, and the approach of the program was in
some ways a government effort to accommodate the issue of community control
being raised repeatedly in the late 1960s. Federal funding and program
flexibility were devices that would allow CDCs to escape some of the neg-
ative impacts of local politics. These policy pronouncements were as
close as the program came to granting relative independence to community
based organizations.*
During the first Nixon administration, OEO began to tighten its
restrictions and policy guidelines concerning the Special Impact Program.
This translated into:
- more formal operating procedures for the SIP program
- more elaborate system(s) of performance monitoring of CDCs
- new standards for the evaluation and approval of business
proposals. 18
More ominus signals concerning the independence of CDCs came after the
appointment of Donald Rumsfeld as director of the OEO:
* Although the repeated emphasis on CDC "independence" in this discussion
makes it seem like independent decision-making is a completely positive
(trouble-free) goal, this report does recognize that some regulation and
monitoring has its uses.
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The new director instituted a system of more careful
monitoring of grantees and prospective grantees, and
he added new checks and balances to OEO's review of SIP
funding proposals and grant recommendations. He also
insisted that SIP grants be made to the "right people." 19
The last sentence was the most threatening, since Rumsfled was heard to
say that QEO had to prevent groups like the Black Panthers from getting
any government funding.
Rumsfeld, Nixon, and their supporters took a very dim view of the
whole community control idea. When one local government complained that
a staff member of an SIP funded CDC was a "Black militant," federal offi-
cials tried (with some success) to severely cripple the program by holding
up its funding.20
The SIP legislation was amended into a slightly more focused program
called Title VII in 1972.* "CDCs funded under this explicitly designated
community economic development program were to engage in a broad range
of activities including business and economic development, community devel-
opment and housing, and manpower training activities. ,21 The Nixon adminis-
tration's specific emphasis focused on "black capitalism," a much touted
panacea for the problems of the ghetto.
In 1974 the program was again amended when OEO was abolished and
the Community Services Administration was created. The new language con-
tai.ned even more reference to business development and profitability. By
1975, the program was narrowed to make sure that it sponsored "a net econ-
omic inflow into the community, venture profitability, and increase in
skilled managers and workers, and reductions in unemployment and public
assistance. ,22 Activities that were not related to these priorities were
* There had been constant efforts to kill OEO all the way along. CSA would
eventually suffer the same pressure. Both programs were definitely
political footballs--unfortunately the merits of CDCs were often not
discussed enough when it was time for CSA refunding by Congress.
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expected to be funded by other sources.
Even with these narrowing priorities, sources indicate that CSA
"had not come to grips fully with serious questions affecting the program's
future. There were questions of philosophy and program quality" among
other things.23 The new directors under the incoming Carter administration
tried to reorganize CSA's administration of the program to create a more
efficient and effective agency. They established new guidelines for CDCs
concerning monitoring and reporting, issued policy guidelines indicating
the kinds of programs CSA was likely to fund and indicated the proper kind
of Board representation and staff training that was required for Title
VII CDCs. A study of Title VII concluded that many of these actions further
served to centralize the authority of the program in Washington which in
turn took some more decision-making power away from the CDCs themselves.24
(CSA's priorities, according to this study, sometimes clashed with the
goals of individual corporations.)
The CDCs weren't completely vulnerable to outside influence. At
times they acted collectively to influence policy and the directives of
the agency. In some cases it is not clear whether new CSA directives
actually followed changing CDC priorities instead of forcing CDCs to
conform. However, it is certain that changing central directives had some
impact on local organizations. "Several CDCs that had received SIP funds
were threatened with defunding if their policies and practices were not
altered significantly."25 As one study aptly noted, changes in the pro-
gram's emphasis "can jeopardize links which CDCs maintain with their res-
pective communities, since such links depend, in part, on the community's
expectation that the CDC will continue to address itself to a range of
social as well as economic needs." 26
23
Chapter I has outlined some of the major issues (concerning the
topic of this report) that have been found in other studies of organiza-
tions operating on the community level. The points presented were gen-
erally those that were found to be important among several sources.
These issues include:
- the conflict between the priorities of a funding institution
and the objectives of a CDC
- the related issue of CDC independence versus the need for
accountability and regulation
- the interference from influential actors and institutions
that wish to constrain CDCs for purely political reasons
The thesis will now examine three cases studies by the author to see how
much agreement there is between some of the points raised in the litera-
ture and the cases to be presented in Chapters II-IV.
24
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CHAPTER II:
A CASE STUDY OF THE
LOWER ROXBURY COMMUNITY CORPORATION
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LRCC: INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDY
This chapter will discuss the history of the Lower Roxbury Com-
munity Corporation in order to determine whether the organization was
able to achieve its objectives in light of any external constraints that
it encountered in its development process. A discussion of the organiza-
tion's experience will indicate any similarities between its relations
with outside support groups and the relationships of other CDCs described
in previous case studies. The conclusions from this evaluation will be
compared to the results of studies in the analysis section of Chapter V.
GENERAL HISTORY
The Lower Roxbury Community Corporation was born in response to a
crisis. In the mid 1960s, the Madison Park section of Lower Roxbury was
slated for substantial urban renewal activity that would ultimately dis-
place the residents living in the area. The Boston Redevelopment Author-
ity (BRA) was acting on a report generated by the Harvard School of Edu-
cation (that called for the creation of a large high-school complex for
Boston students) when it decided that the Madison Park neighborhood was
to be the site of a new high school facility (although some of the mem-
bers of the Boston School Committee wanted to turn lower Roxbury into a
truck terminal for the proposed Inner Belt section of the massive highway
system planned for Boston's southwest corridor). 1
In early 1966, the BRA announced plans for early land acquisition
and the School Committee indicated that it favored a 57 acre plan that
would mean the destruction of an existing racially mixed community of ap-
proximately 480 families. Community residents had witnessed the neigh-
borhood destruction in nearby Washington Park (and other parts of Boston)
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and met in a series of meetings to decide that they would oppose the BRA's
plans unless the authority scaled down the size of the school and sponsored
some replacement housing for the families threatened with removal. When
the BRA suggested that residents relocate to some urban renewal initiated
housing in Washington Park, neighborhood people held fast to their demands
for replacement housing in their own area. In spite of opposition to their
demands from some of Roxbury's other "leading citizens," community people
decided to form LRCC in June of 1966 to help insure that their demands
were met.2
The organization began functioning under the interracial leadership
of Ralph Smith and Shirley Smolinski, and included other key supporters
that proved invaluable to community endeavors. Workers from the Roxbury
Federation of Neighborhood Centers, Cooper Community Center, Norfolk House,
and other organizations donated their time and energy to help the residents
organize and formulate their demands. Although the BRA director Ed Logue
tried to neutralize this community force, the group and its allies became
an official organization with the following purpose:
To further the interest of all the residents in the area
known as Lower Roxbury . . . in matters of housing, edu-
cation, and recreation, and generally to work for the
revitalization of the community . . .3
The Lower Roxbury residents and their allies (who included other
activists, professionals, and some church officials) managed to keep exert-
ing pressure on the bureaucracy even though many people in other parts
of the city felt unable to challenge the urban renewal bulldozer. The
resistance of neighborhood people did not prevent some residents from
moving out of the area once local officials became more earnest about their
southwest corridor highway plans. However, in spite of the beginning of
an exodus, LRCC continued organizing the community for support of the
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demands for new housing. They also contracted with an advocacy planning
group (Urban Planning Aid) to prepare a "site plan map that showed both
the high school and housing for the 480 families who lived in Lower Roxbury"
being built on the same 57.9 acre site. 4
LRCC people pressed their point at a public hearing held in the
Timilty School on July 25, 1966. Later, at a School Committee meeting
in August of that year, community residents called for a delay in early
land acquisition. LRCC carried the struggle even further to the city coun-
cil in November when they and their supporters filled the city council
chambers to make their feelings known.
In spite of the David and Goliath type of battle the neighborhood
people were waging, LRCC managed to obtain certain key concessions from
the BRA in the first week of 1967. On January 5th, the residents of
Lower Roxbury got BRA officials to sign a "Memorandum of Understanding"
which stated that the BRA would set aside at least 15 of the 57 acre school
complex for replacement housing for neighborhood people. At least 400
new or rehabilitated low-moderate units were to be provided and rent sub-
sidies were to be made available if necessary. Since the BRA then recog-
nized LRCC as the official voice of the community, the Memorandum went
on to state that "the housing program for the area will be developed in
consultation with the Lower Roxbury Community Corporation and will be
based on surveys of families as to their locational preference, income
requirements and other appropriate considerations." 5
LRCC's ability to harness community support and outside technical
assistance proved successful in obtaining the Memorandum of Understanding.
Later, in 1968 when government authorities were delaying the initial steps
toward creating the replacement housing, LRCC and its members decided that
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the BRA was not moving fast enough or fulfilling its promises. This
decision to take more of an active role in the development was not warmly
received by the BRA. However, constant pressure and a change in BRA direc-
tors meant that LRCC was officially recognized as the sponsor/developer
of the project in 1969, and became the Project Area committee for the
Campus High Renewal Area in 1969.6 This latter victory would mean that
LRCC would receive money to pay for key staff people over the next few
years, and that staff was also responsible for monitoring the develop-
ment of the nearby high school.
LRCC received a start-up (interest free) loan of $200,000 from the
Joseph Tuckerman Foundation (a Unitarian church related fund) to help pay
for architectural and other fees to plan the replacement housing. The
organization formed an affiliate group with the Tuckerman Foundation called
the Lower Roxbury Development Corporation which would become the legal
vehicle for developing the area according to the priorities of the resi-
dents. LRCC/LRDC was now able to begin implementation of its plans.
The history of this community development from the late 1960s until
the present hasn't exactly occurred in the way that the residents first
hoped that it would. They wanted all the housing replaced in a short
period of time so that their temporary relocation into other neighborhoods
(during construction) would not become permanent. In reality, the develop-
ment took a lot longer than planned, and is still not completely finished
in 1982. LRCC wanted to plan and develop a larger number of units right
away, but the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) was only willing
to finance a certain set number, so the community organization had to settle
for less units initially and try to develop its 400 plus apartments in
stages.
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Phase I, called Smith House, was completed and opened by August
of 1973. It is a twelve story building that contains 132 units of one
bedroom apartments for the elderly. As mentioned, it was financed by the
MHFA, and makes use of federal rent support programs along with a good
number of LRCC's other housing.
Phase II was completed in 1974 and contains 131 units of one and
two bedroom family housing. It is a seven story structure which is called
Haynes House. (Haynes House, like Smith House, is named after a person
who is intimately involved in the growth of LRCC.) LRCC had to change
its original design for Haynes House in order to meet the MHFA requirements
and preferences. This kind of negotiation with MHFA and other agencies
was a major cause for delay in the completion of all LRCC projects.
Phase III (Madison Park) consists of 120 units of townhouse struc-
tures, offering two, three, and four bedroom apartments for low to moderate
income tenants. Phase III opened in 1978, and represents that last phase
actually constructed at this writing. Phase III is also the first part
of the project to be built by a minority contractor.
Phase IV, which is due to be constructed in the near future, will
consist of 143 units of new townhouse structures. (The groundbreaking
for Phase IV was held on April 8, 1982.) Two to three bedroom Section 8
apartments will be offered in these buildings. This Phase, called Madison
Park IV, will be financed differently than Phases I-III. LRCC is making
use of a special city program (11b) which allows the organization to issue
tax exempt bonds through the Boston Housing Authority in order to raise
funds to finance the project. This strategy will give LRCC/DC more control
over the financing than they had under the MHFA sponsored efforts.8  In
return, the BHA can ask that a few of its public housing tenants be allowed
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to live in some of the new Phase IV units.
In the past LRCC has also considered including a social service
element in its plans, and additionally wanted to upgrade the neighboring
Whittier Street Housing project. These ideas never became reality for
various reasons, and the organization has basically concentrated on develop-
ing Phases I-IV (a full time job). LRCC is still interested in the fate
of Whittier Street, and might look into its development again once Phase
IV is completed. The Corporation is also contemplating ideas like a super-
market for the area, but no concrete plans exist for this yet. 9
ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION
The Lower Roxbury Community Corporation (or Council as it was orig-
inally called) had its beginnings as a purely voluntary effort of concerned
residents, and has never had more than two full-time staff people employed
by the organization. Ralph Smith has been the only paid director of the
organization. There have been consultants, interns, and pro-bono profes-
sional services incorporated into the organization's strategies over time.
Yet the key factor in sustaining the group has been the involvement of
a small committed group of people since the start of the organization. 10
In the 1960s, this core group was part of a larger neighborhood
constituency, but people gradually moved away from the neighborhood or
became inactive for various other reasons. This left only a few hard
workers like the director, the board members, and a couple of other sup-
porters to provide the effort to offset the corporation's small staff size.
This changing level of voluntary input also allowed LRCC to function
without a great deal of money.
The Board of Directors of LRCC, which has been an integral part of
the development, comes from elected representatives of the organization's
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membership. This Board in turn appoints 4 members to the Board of LRDC.
The other 3 positions on the LRCC Board are filled by representatives of
the Tuckerman Foundation. The chairperson of the (DC) Board is always
to be selected by LRCC so that the community would always remain in control
of the organization. 1
Decision-making has moved from more of a mass-based activity to
the responsibility of the board and staff of the corporation. This pri-
marily occurred as LRCC evolved from strict advocacy into a development
role. The development process was apparently too drawn out to sustain
mass participation (especially since many residents had moved from the
area). Also, as one early participant noted, once the concessions were
obtained from the BRA, the organization didn't need as much organizing
emphasis because the development phase only needed a few key actors. 12
LRCC hasn't really changed its focus, since its goals for replacing
the lost housing were very real and the major organizational efforts in
Phases I through IV have been addressing these goals. Unfortunately, a
number of the original residents moved, so many early participants never
got that replacement housing. (Present residents, almost all black, are
mostly newcomers to the area.) Yet LRCC did provide a service to the com-
munity by creating attractive new housing units that have won planning/
design awards.
Some critics of the organization maintain that LRCC is not very
responsive to input from many of the present residents into organizational
decision-making. 13 While this doesn't necessarily hamper the corporation's
Phase IV plans, bad blood between LRCC and some tenants in the complex
could prevent future organizational growth, since the group's early strength
came from resident support, and LRCC in later years might need to draw on
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this volunteer effort. However, an examination of LRCC's recent past sug-
gests that the organization presently has enough political influence to
implement its present Phase IV plans.
FUNDING HISTORY
LRCC arose out of a very strong grass-roots organizing effort, and
initially operated with no real funding. Extensive use of neighborhood
volunteers and time donated by key people from nearby community centers
provided the start-up resources necessary to make the organization opera-
tional and helped it to win its first major battles with the urban renewal
bureaucracy. The group also began small scale community fundraising by
holding festivals, selling goods, and employing other methods for gaining
contributions from its own constituency.
After the memorandum was signed with the BRA in 1967, LRCC obtained
some small grants from private sources to help with the planning of the
new housing. By 1970 the organization had also received the $200,000 in
seed money from the Tuckerman Foundation. There was really no full-time
paid staff until the beginning of the 1970s, when the director and his
secretary were employed by the BRA because of LRCC's status as the Campus
High School Project area committee and thus entitled to funding for staff
support. Funding for staff by the Redevelopment Authority ended in 1976,
and since then staff support has come from syndication proceeds and other
fees from the operation of LRCC's housing. 14
The volunteer effort in LRCC's early endeavors was a clear way of
maintaining community priorities without worrying about the objectives
of a funding body. Community involvement also helped support the organiza-
tion's early (sometimes militant) position that community residents had
a right to stay in the area. Although the BRA director tried to separate
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the community from some of its organizers who were employed by neighbor-
hood centers, this effort failed and the residents and their allies main-
tained a strong support base that operated in the absence of a substantial
amount of funding.15
However, the organization had to contend with fees for architectural
and planning services because not all the professionals involved with the
group could donate their services. Therefore, to augment volunteer and
community support, the group sought some grants from private sources. The
relationship with two of these funders will be examined more closely in
order to further study the interaction between LRCC and its support insti-
tutions.
In 1968 LRCC applied for a small grant from the Joint Urban Fund
of the Diocese of Massachusetts. Before deciding on the grant, the Joint
Urban Fund asked an independent (but church related) observer to evalute
LRCC and its application for funding. This person wrote to LRCC and told
the group:
. . . that while supporting the validity of the needs
your proposal reflects, I recommend that some greater
input of professional help is incorporated into your
proposal. I believe that the board and staff structure
of the LRCC . . . must be assessed and altered. . . .16
In October of 1968, LRCC sent a response to this letter which essentially
rejected this type of outside influence:
The change and "reassessments" you suggest are alternately
unnecessary, unacceptable and marked by a sense of unreality
or simply extremely harmful . . .
The Board strongly resists professionalism of the sort
which you suggest, feeling that its only result would
be a distancing of LRCC from the community and a consequent
ineffectiveness . . .17
Obviously, LRCC's strong sense of purpose and community backing
allowed it to take a firm stand, even when it meant possibly obtaining
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the necessary funds from this particular foundation. The Joint Urban Fund
did, however, give a $7000 grant to the Corporation in 1969 in spite of
their tough stance, suggesting that LRCC's credibility as a community group
was strong enough to outweigh the problems that the evaluator had with
the organization.
LRCC's primary funder at this time, the Tuckerman Foundation, was
more flexible in allowing the group to set its own priorities. Although
the Unitarian Church backed foundation formed a joint corporate entity
with LRCC (i.e., LRDC--the development component) and maintains 3 out of
7 seats on the LRDC board, its influence on the direction of the group
has been minor and mainly beneficial, according to several persons involved
with the evolution of the corporation. A member of the foundation handles
the organization's bookkeeping and pays most of the bills generated by
the group.
This relation still exists in part because LRCC has not paid back
all of the $200,000 no-interest loan it got from the Tuckerman group.
Apparently the Fund has been very understanding about this slow repayment,
especially since LRCC's attempts at development represent the only real
successful housing development efforts sponsored by the Unitarian-backed
group in the area.* 18 Through Board memberships, Fund representatives
can provide additional assistance without refunding the organization.
While in theory this involvement could seem potentially compromising, the
success of LRCC in meeting its major housing objectives suggests no iden-
tifiable major harm in the relationship. Since the beginning, the founda-
tion had pledged to maintain a low profile in program operation if LRCC
* The Unitarians had been involved in very problematic housing developments
elsewhere in Lower Roxbury that they eventually lost control of and were
forced to abandon.
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was fairly successful in accomplishing its proposed objectives.
Another potential place for compromising the program objectives
came from LRCC's later staff support from the BRA. On the surface, LRCC's
being funded by the agency it fought for several years seems like a prob-
lematic arrangement. LRCC battled the BRA just to get them to sign the
Memorandum, and then found that they still had to fight to become the
area's developer once the BRA dragged its feet in putting together the
new housing. LRCC sent a letter to the BRA in May 1968 indicating that
it wanted to be the developer for the Madison Park area. 9 By then, a
new director had taken over Ed Logue's place at the BRA. This person
(Hale Champion) made a very cool response to LRCC's letter. After acknowl-
edging the principle of the Memorandum, he stated that "this does not and
cannot turn over the ultimate decision-making role of the BRA to LRCC."20
LRCC representatives had a few stormy meetings with Champion, and ultimately
got him to change some of his views, and by the following year LRCC had
moved into the development position.
After this encounter with Champion, the organization's relation-
ships with the BRA improved significantly. The Directorship of the Auth-
ority changed hands several times, so by the year that LRCC staff was
funded, it (LRCC) was working with a more sympathetic BRA director. The
BRA also found it politically rewarding to point to LRCC as a "model" of
how they could cooperate with a community group since many of the other
BRA efforts were highly criticized by many community activists around
Boston.
Finally, with the organization now being funded from syndication
proceeds, the issue of outside funding related influence has been mini-
mized (unless the continued involvement of the Tuckerman group is counted
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in terms of influence). As mentioned previously, the special arrangement
under the city's 11b program presumably gives the group (LRCC) more control
over resources for Phase IV. Other revenue could potentially come from
LRCC's involvement with the Southwest Corridor Project, but right now LRCC
is simply monitoring the development of nearby parcel 18.
RELATIONS WITH EXTERNAL FORCES
As fortunes changed for the Corporation, its relationships with
other outside forces became more positive. Another director took over the
21BRA who was more friendly to the organization. One of LRCC's founding
organizers, Dan Richardson, became the HUD area director, and thus a very
helpful ally. Over the years, LRCC began to develop friendly connections
in the city government, the MHFA, and other agencies. Thus, they moved
from a hostile advocacy role to one that could be described as working
within the system.
This does not mean that LRCC had an easy road to travel with dif-
ferent officials after 1969. There were many delays caused by varying re-
quirements of agencies connected with the projects. In one case, the or-
ganization had to repeatedly submit plans and drawings for Haynes House
to try and reach an agreement with the MHFA. LRCC was finally forced to
abandon some of the elements it wanted included in this project just to
get the structure built.22  In another instance, LRCC wanted Phase III
to be cooperative structures, but MHFA would not back this idea so the
Corporation decided to drop this request. These kinds of encounters with
a cooperating agency were not isolated events and such negotiations delayed
the completion of LRCC's plans. This indicates that the organization's
contacts could aid them in the development process, but these relation-
39
ships with key people were not enough to insure that all of the group's
plans were implemented.
DISCUSSION
If LRCC's original goals concerning replacement housing were to
be used as a measuring rod for organizational tenacity in the face of ex-
ternal constraints, then LRCC certainly has been quite successful. Al-
though the organization has generated other ideas and plans, the replace-
ment housing was and is the major objective. The seeds of the original
organizing effort have grown to fruition.
Getting these seeds to grow took a lot of organizational effort
that was not necessarily confined to the technical aspects of the project.
The need to build Phases I through IV has also meant the promotion of con-
tacts and political resources in order to overcome potential bureaucratic
hurdles. One proposal for a specific project has letters of support from
the mayor, governor, a senator, and heads of the MHFA, BHA, and the Office
of State Planning. This kind of support undoubtedly helped LRCC accomplish
much of its original plans, although the final products are often differ-
ent from first draft plans. 23
However, the need to maintain good relations with key outside people
might have helped to distance the organization from some of its present
constituency who are largely newcomers to the area. While these external
affiliations may not have been the main cause of a deterioration of neigh-
borhood-organizational unity (as evidence suggests that it isn't) the impor-
tance of these external relations could take precedence over internal
relations since the former at this stage was more instrumental in getting
the later phases built.24 Although it is important for LRCC to maintain
its public sector contacts to aid the organization's housing efforts, it
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also could be wise for the group to incorporate newer community residents
into the development process to insure organizational continuity in case
older supporters become innactive.
It is in LRCC's interest to maintain a strong constituency, since
this same human energy was LRCC's original source of strength and indepen-
dence. A shift in political winds and a governmental staff change-over
might make this potential support source much more necessary in the
future. Plans that LRCC might want to implement could clash with official
priorities, and an organized constituency would help negotiate certain
impasses.
LRCC has perhaps anticipated this problem by seeking and obtaining
a grant from the Local Initiatives Support Center (sponsored by the Ford
Foundation) for resident-management training. The idea is to train resident
managers to take over the responsibility for running LRCC's housing units.
This effort should help to increase participation within the complex by
promoting the spirit of cooperation.
In spite of a few faults, LRCC has managed to accomplish a great
deal with very little resources. It has done this partly by limiting its
objectives to almost exclusively the housing area, and has learned how
to develop housing well. This learning experience was a long and tedious
process, but in the end LRCC has much to show for its efforts.
CONCLUSIONS (RELATED TO THE THESIS TOPIC)
The following conclusions can be drawn from the case study just
presented:
- LRCC's objective and strategies were not substantially altered
or affected by the influence of outside funding sources. The
CDC has come very close to its original goal of providing
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replacement housing (with the last phase currently under
construction).
- LRCC did suffer some minor setbacks concerning specifics of
certain projects (such as the desire to build more housing
earlier or wanting to start housing coops) because of the
power of housing financers to determine what kind of develop-
ment will take place.
- LRCC felt no ill effects from political opposition after its
activist phase because it had established good relations with
key actors in public institutions. During the pre-Memorandum
period, LRCC's community organizing efforts provided the neces-
sary clout to win the concessions it needed to build the
housing.
- LRCC's low funding level (and small staff) made it less reliant
on outside funds to function (except for financing the housing).
The use of community and professional volunteers greatly aided
the group in avoiding becoming dependent on a larger.funding
entity (and its priorities).
These conclusions will be compared to results of the RAP and GRDC case
studies to see what their different experiences can indicate concerning
the potential for "independent" action on the part of CDCs operating in
the same black community.
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CHAPTER III:
A CASE STUDY OF THE
ROXBURY ACTION PROGRAM
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RAP: INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDY
This chapter will examine the experience of the Roxbury Action Pro-
gram to determine whether the organization was able to achieve its objec-
tives in light of any external constraints encountered in its development
process. The degree of outside interference in RAP's efforts will be
analyzed by documenting their relations with funders and other external
support groups. The results of this study will be re-examined in Chapter V
in a general discussion of all three cases.
GENERAL HISTORY
The Roxbury Action Program began as a Quaker sponsored housing
advocacy project in August of 1964. The organization was called the Metro-
politan Low Income Housing Project (MLIHP) and it opened an office on Blue
Hill Avenue in Roxbury. Tasks undertaken by the Housing Project included
work on housing code enforcement and tenants' rights. The American Friends
Service Committee (AFSC) was heavily involved with the project, and helped
select its interracial staff.
After the riots of 1967, some of the black staff members felt that
the organization should be autonomous and community controlled. The black
caucus of the AFSC raised these demands at a Quaker retreat in 1967, and
over a period of time convinced some of the reluctant AFSC members to agree
to sponsor an independent black organization that was designed to be more
responsive to the needs of the community. For a variety of reasons, the
founders of RAP decided that the Highland Park section of Roxbury was
fertile ground on which to build their new organization, so they moved
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to that location in 1969.*1
RAP made this transition after the organization had incorporated
in December of 1968 and received a "no strings" grant from the AFSC for
$92,000 to help start RAP's programs. At that point in the organization's
history, RAP's director, George Morrison, stated that the initial focus
of RAP should be:
. . . to prevent the neighborhood from going the way of
Boston's South End and to organize people not in terms
of intangibles (like services), but in terms of the tan-
gibles of home ownership "to preserve the destiny of the
community of black people" . . .2
After moving to Highland Park, RAP became interested in pursuing a compre-
hensive strategy that included social, economic, and physical development.
Underlying this orientation was a basic philosophy that contained the
following elements:
- An emphasis on Black Self Determination
- The need for community people to control their own turf
- The need to promote home ownership 3
An emphasis on Black Nationalism translated into RAP's celebrating Black
holidays, sponsoring cultural events, and making an effort to promote
black consciousness in a mostly minority neighborhood (70% black, 20% white,
10% hispanic). This was a key element in their desire to build a model
black community.
The turf control orientation focused on an effort to increase home
ownership and housing opportunities, plus maximize the community's control
over what happened to the numerous abandoned houses and vacant parcels
in the Highland Park area. RAP wanted to buy properties and influence
the sale of other properties to prevent the kind of displacement most
* RAP moved to Highland Park because it was relatively untouched in terms
of community organizing and development, while their former location on
Blue Hill Avenue was heavily populated by storefront organization.
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widely associated with Boston's South End. When RAP was given two houses
by the Afro-American Associates (a group of black activists), the housing
development part of their comprehensive development strategy began to
dominate the orientation of the group.
Although RAP initially favored developing housing cooperatives,
they (the leadership) decided that organizing people to develop coops would
be too difficult, and that there was more money available to rehabilitate
rental property.4  RAP began purchasing additional properties, and
acquired 11 of them by 1970. Planning began for RAP's first major hous-
ing development, called RAP UP I.
However, a force within the organization wished to make community
organizing a higher priority than housing development. Some of the people
employed by RAP to organize the constituency didn't feel that they were
getting enough money to accomplish their task. After several meetings
in 1970, the dominant force led by Director George Morrison overruled this
challenge and set the organization on a primarily housing/physical develop-
ment course because they felt that:
. groups that organize without turf control and owner-
ship can loose both turf and people to the economic process
of outside investment and displacement . . . demands of
launching development projects thus had to supersede the
demands of building a large resident member group. . . .5
Over the years, as the organizing effort declined (after 1971), more
emphasis was placed on Black cultural traditions as a means for trying to
appeal to the constituency.
Housing development continued with renewed strength as RAP's leader-
ship pulled together a great deal of outside (largely free) professional
talent to help design and plan the organization's RAP UP-I project. After
obtaining MHFA financing in 1970, work started on RAP UP-I and was completed
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by 1972. The project cost $500,000 and involved rehabilitating 33 units
in 11 sites that RAP had purchased (and eventually housed 150 low-moderate
income tenants). RAP packaged a limited partnership for this deal and
ultimately became the manager and owner of these units.
When RAP-UP-I was completed, RAP concentrated its energy in the
areas of property development and management, business development and
management, and human service delivery. Even though property development
was the highest priority, RAP also employed staff to work with: a continu-
.ing education program; a youth center; senior citizen activities; crime
prevention; and general tenant/community organizing.6
Business development was mainly attempted in RAP's joint venture
with CVCF (Circle Venture Capital Fund, later a part of GRDC), which was
started in- 1973. This venture, the Roxbury Action Pharmacy, started with
an investment of $25,000 from CVCF and an SBA loan, lasted until October
of 1976. Since the failure of the Pharmacy, RAP has not emphasized business
development very much in its plans because of the unsuccessful experience
with the Pharmacy (and another venture) and the realization that the
organization was more skillful at putting together housing than businesses.
RAP's first development program (RAP-UP-I) was packaged and con-
structed over a relatively short period of time. This encouraged the or-
ganization to undertake more ambitious planning for the next phase called
RAP-UP-IIA&B. RAP planned for IIA to be a new 7 story building with 8000
sq. feet of commercial space with 140 units of housing. IIB was to include
several units of rehabilitated housing done in conjunction with IIA. The
initiators also wanted to include a hotel-conference center in this part
of their development.7
However, HUD was not willing to finance the hotel-conference center
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idea, and decided that it was only able to fund the IIB part of the pro-
ject at first. RAP secured HUD financing for IIB in 1972. When Presi-
dent Nixon initiated a freeze on housing programs in early 1973, RAP
argued that its funds for IIB were already committed to the project.
After a successful lobbying effort, the organization got this phase
funded and constructed. It contained 51 units of rehabilitated low-mod-
erate income housing in 11 buildings. The project also included 3,100
sq. feet of commercial space (IIB's total cost equalled $1,220,000).
RAP-UP-IIA was delayed by Nixon's housing moratorium while work
went ahead on IIB. RAP decided to have the financing responsibility for
IIA shifted from HUD to MHFA because the organization felt that MHFA was
more flexible in its planning/design requirements. As it turns out, RAP
had to constantly re-submit drawings to the MHFA to get the project con-
sidered. RAP finally reached an agreement with MHFA in April 1975 on the
financing of IIA. The project had a projected cost of $4,700,000 and was
scaled down to 125 units and 2,500 sq. feet of commercial space. The
deal seemed ready to go after RAP had secured a 121A tax abatement from
the BRA which was essential to the development of IIA.
However, MHFA had financial problems and stopped making loans for
a period of time. Interest rates began to climb, thus dooming the fi-
nancial feasibility of RAP-UP-IIA. By 1976, RAP had to try and structure
a new deal for the project. The need to raise additional funds to pay
mounting organizational debts forced RAP to explore syndication deals
that would yield generous fees and proceeds.
RAP wanted to be the general partner in any syndication deal so
that it could retain full control and ownership of the IIA development.
Yet, new MHFA regulations stipulated that in order for groups to obtain
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MHFA financing as a general partner, they must have a net worth equal to
20% of the MHFA mortgage amount.8  RAP could not neet these requirements
because of its poor financial position.
By 1977 RAP was searching for a co-general partner that had suffi-
cient financial worth, but also one that would give RAP control over the
project. While RAP had problems putting this kind of deal together, their
originally designated construction company dropped out of the deal as costs
rose, forcing RAP to negotiate a new financing package. They succeeded
in getting a large non-minority development/construction company inter-
ested in the deal (Macomber Co.), but had to redesign IIA in order to make
it acceptable once again to MHFA. RAP also had to negotiate new 121A
status with the city in order to get the project under way.
MHFA tentatively approved a deal in April of 1978 with RAP and
Macomber, but then RAP had difficulties with Macomber, and on top of that
the city decided that it wasn't definite about the 121A status. RAP again
tried to straighten out these difficulties, and began the new year (1979)
with no deal and mounting debts.* Because the organization badly needed
some proceeds from syndication (and it wanted the project built), RAP
offered Macomber Co. the sole general partner's position in February 1979
(after exploring other developers, contractors, and financial options).
Macomber Co. agreed to take the general partner's position and
offered RAP a 1% non-paying limited partner position. RAP and Macomber
were to co-manage IIA, while RAP would receive $500,000 in developer's
fees and $158,000 for the land. 10  (Macomber, however, would own and con-
trol the project.) The deal was altered somewhat so that RAP received
* The organization owed money for a food stamp program it previously tried
to operate. Debts from food stamps and from RAP-UP-IIA were approximately$650,000 combined. RAP also owed $100,000 to the Episcopal City Mission
which added to its debt burden.9
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developer's fees of $600,000 over a period of time. After RAP and Macomber
fought (and compromised) over the issue of minority hiring, the deal was
made and the groundbreaking was held in June 1979. The final cost was
$700,000 and the final design consisted of 162 housing units which includes
155 one-bedroom units and 6 multiple bedroom units. Most of the one-
bedroom units are occupied by elderly people. The project was operational
by 1981, and houses approximately 250 tenants with 2,300 square feet of
commercial space.
RAP is also in the midst of implementing its Kittredge Square Family
Housing program which is financed through the State's 705 program. RAP
started planning this in 1974, and the project was recently undergoing
construction until the contractor went bankrupt. The organization is cur-
rently trying to find a new contractor to continue the work. When finished,
the project will contain 26 rehabilitated units in 9 buildings. (The
total cost of the 705 housing is $1,750,000.) Because of the 705 regula-
tions, the Boston Housing Authority owns these units, while RAP is the
developer/sponsor.
The organization is currently planning to implement its new develop-
ment called RAP-UP-III. At a projected cost of $5,450,000, the plans call
for 104 units of new housing in 72 structures. (This project will be sup-
ported by Section 8 housing subsidies.) In addition, RAP is planning to
rehabilitate a structure in John Eliot Square and create the Marcus Garvey
Office Building at a cost of $1,200,000.
The organization's emphasis on social service and human development
has increased in recent years, largely through the efforts of the present
director Lloyd King and former employees (Pearl Shelton, Pat Raynor, and
others) who stressed the importance of non-physical development in the
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neighborhood. The programs were sponsored in part because the organiza-
tion did not want to be perceived as a cold, calculating developer, and
wished to respond to the human needs of the community. Also, problems
with crime and youth delinquency led to the formation of a youth center,
youth training operations, and a crime prevention program. In addition,
RAP sponsored a senior citizen program (run by RAP supporter Ed Cooper)
that has been very successful in getting older people involved in gar-
dening, buying clubs, and other activities.
An indication of the kinds of programs RAP is currently involved
with can be seen in Figure II (page 61), which lists the programs and
their sources of support from 1980 through 1981.11 While RAP's social
service component receives less publicity, it is an important part of the
organization's operation (although it may not be done as well as property
development--at least according to one former employee).
Over the years, RAP has offered services to homeowners by encourag-
ing them (with technical assistance) to get 312 home improvement loans
and other types of property upgrading assistance. They also put together
a special home improvement program with the use of CSA funds in 1976.
Although this type of activity was not their main task, it does represent
an effort on their part to strengthen the position of lower income home-
owners in the Highland Park area.
FUNDING HISTORY
The Roxbury Action Program has a very interesting funding history.
In 1969, the organization's leadership (primarily the executive director)
felt the need for RAP to avoid the kind of large federal grants available
to the Special Impact Programs because this kind of money had too many
"strings" attached to it, and would presumably prevent RAP from making
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autonomous decisions about development goals. 12 Their alternative strat-
egy was to pursue a mix of public and private funds for administrative
support and program operation. They relied on grants (or no interest
loans) from foundations, corporations, and even individuals. They did
not receive a direct federal grant for program support until 1976 (which
was the CSA grant mentioned above).
RAP had to aggressively seek various sources of funding because
it did not think that the kind of self-sufficiency many groups talked
about was a viable goal. Earning a high enough rate of return on invest-
ments in a low-income community seemed unlikely to RAP's leadership, so
they knew that fundraising would be a constant need. However, in the
early 1970s they did state that "RAP hopes only that eventually its prop-
erties may be strong and numerous enough to support a small central staff,
but services to the neighborhood and other development projects will for
many years require funds from other sources." 13
After the initial unrestricted grant of $92,000 from the AFSC at
the organization's beginning, RAP received private funding from such
diverse sources as the Episcopal City Mission, the Shawmut Bank, and even
some preplanning funding from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*
They got direct public funding from agencies including the Community Ser-
vices Administration and the Model Cities Program. Money received for
specific development projects came from the MHFA, the Small Business
Administration, the 705 program, and lastly, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development.
The level of private (unrestricted) funding from 1969-1976 is shown
* The funds from MIT were used to help plan RAP-UP-III in 1972. Part of
this money was used to pay professionals assisting in the project.
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in Table I.14 The level of unrestricted aid from foundations rose relative
to the support from individuals and corporations over that period. Total
restricted and unrestricted revenues are shown for 1973, 1974, and the
period from October 1, 1980 to September 31, 1981 in Table II.*15 Table II
indicates a general fall in the level of support, and absolute decline
in individual contributions, and the rising importance of revenues gener-
ated by RAP's projects.
It is almost impossible to trace every grant and loan that RAP
received over a period of 13 years. The available information indicates
that the organization did achieve its goal of not being too dependent on
any one source of funding for its operations. However, this diversity
of support (and lower funding than a Title VII) came at a price, since
RAP had accumulated significant debts from its operations over the years.
This debt and the need to raise money for new projects kept RAP's fund-
raisers very busy. Fundraising was (and is) very crucial to the survival
of this organization. RAP could have elected to pursue larger scale fund-
ing from CSA and Title VII, but it chose a more difficult strategy of
piecing together smaller loans and grants.**
However, the arguments for their kind of funding strategy are
numerous. The present RAP director (Lloyd King) feels that RAP's need
to hustle for money and deals made it more interested in putting together
better development packages since the organization's survival depended
more on successful deals than a Title VII CDC. 16  RAP's former director
(George Morrison) still strongly suggests that this kind of funding approach
is preferable to all-encompassing grants because the organization was able
* The reasons for this choice are explored in a later section.
** Figures for the remaining years were not readily available.
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Table I
Roxbury Action Program
Unrestricted Contributions*
Founda-
tionst
$42,087
77,170
72,500
58,500
63,000
63,500
85,500
95,000
Corpora-
tions
$ 5,000
5,000
6,500
11,250
8,500
5,775
* Excludes grants
dollar value of
dollar value of
for specific service programs, and also excludes the
the interest on noninterest-bearing notes and the
contributed services
t Includes gifts from church sources
T Includes two pieces of property valued at $12,000
Fiscal
Year
Ending
Sept.
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Number
Donors
1
4
10
13
14
20
25
23
Individ-
ual s
$ 5,000
8,650
6,480
3,000
15,500
2,800
1,950
Total
$ 42,087
87,500
81,150
69,980
72,500
90,250
96,800
102,725
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Table II
Roxbury Action Program, Inc.
Consolidated Statement of Revenues
For the Years Ended September 30, 1974 and 1973
Revenues:
Grants and contributions:
Government agencies
.Foundations
Individuals
Corporations
Other revenues:
Rents
Management fee
Other
1974
$122,676
64,000
15,787
10,250
212,713
15,536
8,143
4,892
28,571
Development fee income -_
$241,284
Statement of Revenue for 10/1/80 - 9/30/81
1973
$ 98,890
72,398
4 ,397
6,337
182,022
15,497
3,960
2,440
21,897
191,000
$394,919
Public Support and Revenue
Publ ic Support:
Foundations
Corporations
Total
Revenue
Government Contracts
Rental Income
Interest Income
Development Fee
Total
Total Support and Revenue
$ 20,000.00
32,000.00
52,000.00
110,104.00
30,677.00
68.00
15,000.00
155,849.00
$207,849.00
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to make "independent" development decisions. 17 RAP's widespread use of
free professional and non-professional talent also made them less depen-
dent on outside aid and the whims of a single funder.
The need to make independent decisions in some cases caused RAP
to divert a portion of its supposedly restricted funding into other uses
that they felt were more pressing at the time. According to one former
employee, "RAP would sing the tune of some philanthropic agency, use the
money for some other purpose, and then cop a plea."18 Unfortunately this
caused some funders to not refund RAP because of their (RAP's) disregard
for the directives of the support group concerning the restrictions on
aid to the organization. Losing potential sources of funds made RAP's
attempts to stay financially solvent more difficult.
Lloyd King also mentioned that while overall funding is down, RAP
never had enough money in the first place to keep sufficient control over
the turf in Highland Park or a RAP project like IIA. He added that the
organization didn't receive enough money that could be used for land
banking, a strategy that would have greatly aided RAP's efforts. Lack of
money (and available support) also forced RAP to seek mostly tenant sub-
sidized housing projects, and didn't allow it to put as much emphasis on
creating more homeowning opportunities for low-moderate income people.
Still, people connected with RAP maintain that they had a good re-
lationship with many funding sources (not many attempts by funders trying
to exert pressure on the organization). One of the few negative aspects of
a relationship with a funder was mentioned when Mr. King stated that RAP
had to downplay its black cultural emphasis when it applied for direct
federal funding. Also, former director Morrison indicated that incidents
that happened in the community did have an effect on the level of funding
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received from some sources.*
In general (according to most observers), the explicit directives
of a funding body did not seem to outwardly change RAP's priorities. How-
ever, the effects of funders and other external influences did directly
or indirectly affect the outcomes of RAP's endeavors. This influence will
be explained more fully in some of the following sections.
ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION
After RAP's official birth in 1969, the organization grew into a
large entity responsible for many functions (see Figure I for the organiza-
tional chart of actors and activities). 19  Although the group was officially
governed by a 13 member (elected) board (or policy committee), many sources
indicate that the strong leadership has come from the executive director's
office. In fact, the first director's dominant personality and approach
was credited with setting organizational priorities, gathering a wide range
of outside talent, and extracting other resources from various external
actors.**20 (Former director Morrison's forceful style was also respon-
sible for discouraging some potential supporters from participating.)
RAP's internal staff has experienced a large degree of turnover.
(RAP presently has 7+ paid staff people.) This was in part due to the
fact that staff did not receive high salaries. The organization also ex-
perienced several financial crises, forcing many to go through payless
paydays. Even though the organization originally had a (self-taxing)
survival fund to help its workers, it could not prevent financial
* He was referring specifically to an instance where community people
decided to give corporate donated funds to the African Liberation Sup-
port Committee--an action that prevented further funding from that
particular source.
* Morrison had arranged for a group of outside professionals to meet once
a week at RAP to discuss the organization's future strategies.
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difficulties from affecting its employees. This kind of strain, attrac-
tive jobs elsewhere, and the hard work surrounding RAP's efforts helped
fuel this turnover.
While housing and property development was and is a high priority,
RAP still maintained staff to run programs like the youth center, youth
services, and community services and education (see Figure II).21 As men-
tioned previously, the role (and number) of community organizers declined
since the start of the organization. In contrast to the organizers, the
importance of the fundraiser increased drastically given the declining
level of national support for community organizations in the last decade.
RAP never enjoyed the kind of wide popular support that LRCC did
in Lower Roxbury, primarily because it arose out of different circum-
stances. It came into the neighborhood from the outside in 1969, and
had many of its objectives already determined. Not all of the residents
liked its style and orientation, and some of the newcomers to Highland
Park didn't appreciate the fact that it was creating more subsidized
housing units in the area.22 RAP does have a group of supporters in the
community although some would argue that the number is too small and that
RAP shouldn't have abaondoned its earlier organizing efforts. However,
in spite of RAP's smaller constituency, the organization's key supporters
have been very instrumental in aiding the staff with its attempts to
achieve the group's stated objectives.
EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS
Over the years, RAP has experienced a changing relationship with
local government and other external sources of potential support. While
the organization had good relations with one BRA director in the early
1970s, they did run into trouble with the city over getting some land
Figure II
RAP
Human Service Budget Staffing
(1980-1981)
Component
Youth
Youth Administrator
Youth Counsellor
Youth Counsellor
Family, Individual
Life & Education
Counseling
Social Worker P/T
Social Worker P/T
RAP, Inc., Administration
Executive Director
Bookkeeper/Secretary
Service
Counseling
Crisis Intervention
Employment (Summer
& Year Round)
Counseling
Tutorial
Housing Support
Homemaker
Information & Referral
Cost
$41,109
Funding
$41,109
$22,698 $22,698
$42,480
Sources
D.M.H.
Division of
Drug Rehabilitation
EEPA
Department of Social
Services
Foundation
Resource Mobilization
Effective Human Services
Develop Service System
(vertical system)
Chb
I-J
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parcels and also obtaining 121A status for RAP-UP-IIA. 23 They tried to
work through friendly contacts at city hall with moderate success. One
observer, however, stated that many forces in local government consid-
ered RAP a political threat.24 This cannot be documented, but it is a
matter of record that (then) RAP director Morrison didn't endorse the
mayor for re-election one year, and some people feel that this may have
hindered RAP's development efforts. 25
In 1974, RAP was designated the primary community planning group
for the BRA in Highland Park, meaning that the organization had a say in
(but not control over) what that agency did in the area. While this
stemmed from the agency's positive relationship with the BRA director, it
did not mean that RAP enjoyed sustained help from the city. In 1975, the
RAP director "issued a press release blasting the deputy mayor for foot-
dragging and bureaucratic delays" in a project that the organization was
working on in John Eliot Square. 26 This underscored the fact that RAP
at times was forced into an adversarial position with the city.
Recently (in 1978), RAP hired a (non-minority) legal firm with con-
tacts in city hall to try and get the 121A status for RAP-UP-IIA.27 This
special effort indicates that RAP found its traditional communication
channels blocked. Some of RAP's critics in Highland Park suggest that
the organization has lost its political clout since the early 1970s, and
has little influence over what happens to parcels of city land in the
28
neighborhood. Other sources indicate that RAP's high ideals concerning
Black self-determination further limited their influence with traditional
power brokers as they were considered too radical. 29 This may be true to
some extent, but such sacrifices are almost unavoidable for an organization
*RAP was able to reach these agreements in large part because of LRCC's
earlier efforts to obtain concessions from the BRA and becoming the Campus
High Project Area Committee. (LRCC's district was adjacent to RAP's area,
so RAP took advantage of the BRA's previous commitment to the neighborhood.)
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that is designed to be a relatively "independent" force in the black
community.
RAP did leverage its clout (and successful experiences) as much as
possible to pull resources together for its projects. It had good relations
with some banks and funding sources, although it lost some of this support
over the years. RAP had a white fundraiser/project developer who used
his business contacts to secure aid for the group. Former RAP director
Morrison knew former governor Dukakis which helped to some extent with
the organization's dealings with the state, even though RAP suffered sev-
eral setbacks while trying to get its deals considered by the MHFA.*
When the organization applied for CSA funding in 1976, it realized that
politics was necessary to secure the money, "so RAP made sure it had support
of key congressional figures."30 RAP did manage to get most of its projects
off the ground, even though it was an uphill battle all the way. Former
director Morrison indicates that bureaucratic delays and regulations were
not the main cause of difficulties RAP had with outside forces, but rather
that politics was RAP's biggest external headache over the years.
DISCUSSION
RAP's leadership early on recognized the issue of maintaining the
organization's priorities in the face of pressure of funders (and other
external forces):
. . . despite the inalterable premise of black self deter-
mination, they [RAP] would not cut themselves off from the
advice, the ideas, the skills, and of course the funds that
could come from the more affluent white communit- -so long
as their independence was not compromised. . . .
* One example of this was MHFA's changing the requirement for the developer's
net-worth mentioned previously. Sources indicate, however, that many of
the difficulties were also due to mistakes made by the organization itself,
and the MHFA cannot be blamed totally for the delay.
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After negotiating the tangled web of bureaucratic regulations and local
politics, RAP helped to revitalize a part of the Highland Park community
by developing a small but significant portion of the area's housing stock
(245 units occupied at this writing). They have provided some aid to home-
owners, and a certain amount of social and human services to their constitu-
ency. RAP also managed to channel funds from its projects to black workers
and contractors (with $4,000,000 alone going to contractors and workers
between July 1979 and July 1981). 32
However, the organization's successes fall short of many original
goals, even though the achievements are admirable given the obstacles that
face a non-profit development corporation (or other reliated groups) in
the black community. In spite of a dedicated staff, RAP had to depend
on monies for specific kinds of projects that didn't allow them to pursue
all their objectives (such as more land banking).* RAP's attempts to
direct funds to other purposes caused them to get into trouble with some
funders, which probably served to worsen their financial condition.
Bad financial straits also allowed RAP to lose the controlling
interest in RAP-UP-IIA. MHFA's changing regulations were a major factor
in the lost control, illustrating how much influence an external force
can have on a community organization (although some people feel that the
compromise over IIA was avoidable). The need for RAP to tone down some
of its Black cultural/political orientation is another indicator of outside
influence.
The goal of Black self determination has been tempered by the reality
influences that force CDCs to make some kinds of compromises. One critic
* Although there is some question whether there were actually other sources
of funds that would have supported alternative strategies--some people
feel that alternatives could have been pursued.
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states that "RAP had very little autonomy over the approach it took to
revitalize Highland Park," since it was and is dependent on certain fed-
eral and state programs to develop housing.33 The record indicates that
RAP fought at least to keep its priorities distinct from those of its
direct funders, but faced setbacks when dealing with local politics, pri-
orities of housing finance agencies, and its own lack of financial clout
that would have permitted more control over projects and land parcels.
Even though RAP had to contend with external forces that have ham-
pered its development process, evidence suggests that the organization
made certain mistakes on its own due to bad judgment or other problems.
This report previously mentioned how the loss of control in RAP-UP-IIA
was (apparently) not solely due to actions of outside agencies. While
it is not the intention of this thesis to focus on internal problems of
CDCs, this subject cannot be overlooked. (Chapter V will consider the
role of internal organizational difficulties again in more detail.)
CONCLUSIONS (REGARDING THE THESIS TOPIC)
The following conclusions can be drawn from the case study just
presented:
- RAP did not suffer any significant direct interference from
its funding sources (in terms of changing priorities, stra-
tegies, etc.), although RAP's "unauthorized" use of re-
stricted funds got the organization into trouble with some
support institutions.
- RAP's strategies were apparently constrained by the availabil-
ity of only a select number of housing and other programs.
However, it is not clear whether RAP's leadership chose to vol-
untarily limit their own objectives or fought unsuccessfully for
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alternative strategies (such as cooperative housing, the hotel,
etc.). One observer suggests that RAP could have pushed its
cooperative housing objective in spite of the state and federal
focus on subsidized rental units.34
- RAP did not find bureaucratic regulations a large problem but
did encounter some development difficulties caused by relation-
ships with political (and other government) actors. (Excep-
tions to this statement are Nixon's freeze on housing programs
and the new MHFA "net worth" requirement.)
Other conclusions drawn from this study will be used (along with the ones
listed above) in a comparison of CDCs in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER IV:
A CASE STUDY OF THE
GREATER ROXBURY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
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GRDC: INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDY
Chapter IV will discuss the history of the Greater Roxbury Develop-
ment Corporation in order to determine whether external influence from
OEO/CSA has been a major factor affecting the organization's development
process. The impact of other external forces (or support institutions)
will also be analyzed. The results of this study shall be re-examined in
Chapter V when-GRDC is compared to the other CDCs described in this report.
GENERAL HISTORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION
The history of the Greater Roxbury Development Corporation actually
began with the formation of Circle, Inc., a predecessor group which was
originated in the late 1960s. The original organization was initiated
after a group of black men met to discuss new ways of developing Boston's
black community. This collection of activists decided that the community
needed a resource base in order to increase its economic power.* Since
many of the people at the meeting represented various organizations and
agencies, Circle was designed to be a federation of community groups to
coordinate much of the local economic (and social) development activities
under one roof.1
The personal contacts, skills, and money of the founding members
were supposed to be utilized in the development of the organization.
Circle was (in the long run) intended to be the foundation and catalyst
for building and maintaining several economic institutions that would
* Early Circle members came together at a time of much tension when people
were demanding community control of resources and were seeking to increase
"black power" in the city (and country).
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be responsible for creating an economic infrastructure within the black
community. The monetary surplus from the operations was to go to com-
munity institutions and other positive programs in black neighborhoods
in Boston.
Circle, Inc., was founded in 1968 as a (State of Massachusetts)
nonprofit organization with a stated purpose to "plan and implement pro-
grams of a civic, educational, economic, social, and charitable na-
ture . . .',2 Circle initiated a Speakers Bureau that eventually turned
into a consulting group that began to take on planning contracts and raise
money for the organization. (The consulting group did feasibility pro-
posals for urban renewal programs, manpower programs, etc.) In order to
obtain federal tax exempt status, Circle merged with a group called the
New England Community Development Corporation (NECDC). Together they
formed what was later known as the Circle Complex. The plan of Circle's
leadership was "to bring under one roof the various operations that are
important to economic development promotion--planning, business develop-
ment housing development investments, [and] management training."3
Thirty (30) member organizations and businesses were involved with
Circle's initial development. 23 representatives from these groups sat
on Circle's board (10 members from that board formed the board of direc-
tors for NECDC). Three-fourths of the board members came from groups that
had some grass-roots participation. The involvement of the various groups
was deemed crucial to Circle's goal of coordinating development activities
and pooling resources.
By 1971, the Circle complex was undertaking a variety of programs
through various organizational branches which included a Day Care Center,
an Afro-American Studies Curriculum Research Center, the Roxbury Institute
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of Business Management, and the Small Business Development Center.
Circle also established the Circle Venture Capital Fund which was a for-
profit organization that became the direct predecessor of GRDC. CVCF was
chartered to "plan and implement programs and activities that will pro-
vide an economic impact" on the community.4 All these components of the
complex got their funding from a variety of public and private sources.
Although they had distinct functions, they were coordinated by the
Circle's central administrative staff. (See Figure III for a chart of
the organizational structure.) 5
Circle, Inc., received a planning grant from OEO in 1970, and
regular SIP funding status in 1971. Circle applied for this funding so
that it could create a network of economic development institutions. The
consultant and business training arms of Circle would aid Black busi-
nesses, while CVCF through its venture capital role was to sponsor pri-
marily Circle owned (or substantially controlled) businesses in a more
material way.
Circle also established a number of Precinct Neighborhood Develop-
ment Corporations which were designed to increase the participation of
neighborhood people in development activities.6 The PNDCs allowed resi-
dents in different areas to meet in an organizational form to determine
the specific development needs in their particular sub-neighborhoods.
CVFC was structured so that the Board of Directors consisted of 6 ap-
pointed members of the sponsoring group (Circle) and 5 representatives
elected by the PNDCs. The creation of the PNDCs was in part a result of
pressure from OEO. The government agency had never been comfortable with
Circle being a federation of organizations, and kept pressuring for more
grass-roots (elected) participation in the development process.7
Figure III
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CVCF began to look for ventures in the early 1970s, and faced some
difficulties because they often had to consider potential businesses that
regular financial institutions didn't feel were particularly "bankable."
However, they did succeed in getting some ventures underway. (See Figure
IV for a list of businesses established by 1975.)8 After some learning
experiences, the immediate goals of CVCF became the following:
1) To make loans to and make investments in minority business
that employ a larger number of Special Impact Area (SIA)
residents, that have a potential to generate at least a 6%
return to Circle and that have a capacity to enhance the
economic growth and development of the SIA.*
2) To assume majority control and ownership of businesses that
are labor intensive, that provide needed goods and services
for SIA residents, or that generate a profit in excess of 8%.
3) To acquire and develop a mix of commercial and residential
property in the SIA.
4) To invest in businesses to be sponsored by the five PNDCs. 9
Although CVCF was originally part of the Circle Complex, continued
pressure from OEO forced Circle to split CVCF off from the rest of the
complex so that Circle Venture Capital Fund, and not Circle, Inc., was
responsible for administering OEO's Special Impact Program. The rest of
the Circle Complex of organizations was to serve as a "technical resource
center for organizations indigenous to the Black community . . ."10 (The
next section of this chapter contains further information about this split.)
After 1974-1975, Circle, Inc., was not to receive any OEO money, while
CVCF had the sole responsibility for venture development and investment.
* The Special Impact Area was the overall target area of the organization.
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Figure IV
Circle Venture Capital Fund, Inc. Ventures
(As of 1975)
Venture
Circle Office Building
Savin Realty
Circlepower Demolition
Corporation
Roxbury Action Pharmacy
Lena Park Fire Ext.
Amaechi Mfg., Inc.
Term of Investment
$200,000 equity
$ 67,000 equity
$152,500 equity
40,000 loan
10 yrs. @ 10%
$ 30,000 equity
$ 40,000 equity
$ 70,000 debt
8%- 10 year
Nature of CVCF Control
100% ownership
60% ownership
special agreement
51% ownership
two board seats
Standard contract
40% ownership
two board seats
Standard contract
40% ownership
two board seats
Standard contract
right to monitor
business
loan agreement
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In 1975, the responsibilities for running the SIP program (now called
Title VII) passed to the newly created non-profit organization called the
Greater Roxbury Development Corporation. The ventures were now sponsored
by CVCF, which in turn was owned entirely by GRDC. GRDC had a Board of
Directors which was composed of the following elements:
- 5 representatives of the PNDCs
- 7 representatives of Circle, Inc.
- 7 seats filled by a voting trust
The organization also made an attempt to find board and staff members with
a high level of skill, experiences, and abilities to help make GRDC a more
effective development entity.
By 1976, the organization had further redefined its goals to include
the following:
1) To continue to be an activist organization trying to accom-
plish things that give people a positive feeling about what
is happening in Greater Roxbury.
2) To continue to become more of a major focus of control and/
or influence in the economic and business revitalization
of . . . [the area] . .
3) To begin to more directly affect and involve the residents
of [the area] in our revitalization efforts . . .11
GRDC's primary impact area included most of Roxbury, and its secondary impact
area contained Roxbury, half of North Dorchester, and parts of the South
End and Jamaica Plain sections of Boston. The organization now concentrated
its efforts in planning, business development, land development, and com-
munity and public relations. (Figure V lists the goals of each of its
components as stated in 1976.)12
Over the next two years, GRDC's business component invested in a
new business (although some of the earlier CVCF ventures had begun to fail),
contemplated setting up a revolving loan fund, and planned to aid the
financially troubled Unity Bank. The land development group invested in
some property, completed an office building rehabilitation project, and
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Figure V
Goals of GRDC Components: 1976
PLANNING
- Become the leading planning agency within our Primary Impact Area
LAND DEVELOPMENT
- Establish a successful commercial and residential land development
track record
- Become a leading actor in the collective commercial and residential
land development of the Southwest Corridor
- Build a constituency of commercial and residential property landlords
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
- Build a successful business development track record
- Build a constituency of businesses
PUBLIC AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS
- Create a positive image for GRDC
- Maintain positive congressional and political relations
- Develop and maintain strong and positive community relations
- Build a constituency of residents from throughout GRDC's Special
Impact Area
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pursued a few other real estate investments. The planning group compiled
a land use inventory and plan for the area, and the community relations
component succeeded in generating some media exposure for the organiza-
tion. GRDC also began a program called GRIP (Greater Roxbury Improvement
Program) which concentrated on training workers while at the same time
providing rennovation and lot development services to clients.
The organization also changed internally in two basic ways:
(1) The Board and staff experienced a significant degree of turn-
over. At least some people connected with the group were
unhappy with the organization's leadership, and the growing
tension between the executive director and certain board
members. Other staff presumably were let go for performance
reasons or else sought better career opportunities.
(2) The board structure was changed so that the 19 member board
was arranged in the following way:
- 5 representatives from the PNDCs
- 3 representatives from Circle, Inc.
- 4 voting trust members
- 7 representatives elected directly from the membership 13
Part of the reason for this change was to address the continual criticism
of GRDC concerning its lack of direct representation on its board. OEO/CSA
had constantly raised this point over the years.
GRDC had a large staff (when compared to other CDCs), and many of
the employees had professional degrees. However, this did not prevent
the organization from experiencing major setbacks. By 1980, most of the
business ventures had failed because of management and other problems.
Conflict between some Board members and the executive director also served
to weaken the organization. Accounting and bookkeeping fell into disarray,
a factor that CSA kept complaining about in memos to GRDC.14
79
In March of 1981, GRDC was officially defunded by CSA after that
agency had granted a total of $3,990,211 to GRDC over a five year period.
CSA, in a lengthy "defunding" letter, cited lack of significant business
development and internal changes as some of the prime reasons for their
action. They asked GRDC to submit a "Disposition of Assets" plan so that
government officials could determine whether GRDC could survive as a non-
Title VII CDC.
During 1981, many staff people left voluntarily or were laid off
as the organization tried to accommodate the loss of funding. In order
to stabilize its financial position (besides laying off staff) the organi-
zation considered selling off some of its assets. (See Figure VI for a
list of GRDC's assets as of 1981.)15
Presently, GRDC has four staff people: a new managing director; a
real estate manager; an administrative assistant; and a book~keeper. Since
all of the organization's assets were in real estate, it will be focusing
on real estate/land development in the immediate future. GRDC now wants
to decrease the size of its Board to make it more manageable, and also
seeks to "change its Articles and By-Laws to ensure more direct community
participation and yet be eligible for venture financing from the Massachu-
setts Community Development Finance Corporation"16 (and other state and
federal agencies interested in economic development). The new 12 member
Board would be composed of 7 members elected from membership in greater
Roxbury, and 5 representatives from the private sector.
GRDC is now doing its best to adjust to a post Title VII world.
The organization now tries to think of itself as a developing CDC with
limited resources. The disposition plan stated that "GRDC must move to
*a small community entrepreneur role . . ."7 Whatever the strategy, GRDC
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Figure VI
A List of GRDC Assets: 1981
90 Warren Street: 2 story office building, rehabed by GRDC, Value approx.
= $150,000
84 Warren Street: 2 story commercial structure, rehabed by GRDC, Value
approx. = $120,000
95-97 Harrishof Street: two 3-family buildings, rehabed by GRDC, Value
approx. = $90,000-$100,000
541 Shawmut Avenue: abandoned industrial building, Value approx. = $65,000
3 houses in Dorchester: Value approx. = $10,000
40 Warren Street: empty lot, Value approx. = $30,000
972 Blue Hill Avenue: Oil Distribution Center, Value approx. = $100,000
Franklin Park Developments I & II: 20 apartment buildings containing 373
units, Value approx. = unknown
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will have a much tougher road to travel without the massive inflow of
Title VII resources.
FUNDING HISTORY
Initially, the founders of Circle spent some time thinking about
pooling their human and financial resources in order to bring this new
organization into a development stage. However, the ambitious plans of
the group and the availability of outside funding eventually made Circle
focus on external resources. They received $38,000 in 1968 from the Rock-
efeller Foundation, and also began to earn fees as a consulting group.18
By 1971, the various components of Circle Complex were funded by a diverse
list of public and private sources (see Table III for a breakdown of these
funding sources). 19
The quest for Special Impact funding began in 1968 when Circle
sent a sketchy proposal to OEO. Although Circle wasn't funded that year,
OEO used a portion of Circle's proposal in part of the literature describ-
ing what the SIP was all about. There was a second attempt to obtain OEO
funding, and then in 1970, Circle received the planning grant. Later,
in 1971 Circle was given an operational grant by the agency which estab-
lished a formal relationship which was to last ten years.
Between 1969 and 1970, when Circle was trying to acquire the SIP
money, they were told by some OEO officials that they (Circle) ought to
consider changing the structure of their organization to allow for more
direct grass-roots participation on the Board. This was not the last time
Circle and OEO disagreed about how Circle should be structured. In 1972,
OEO suggested that CVCF should be the group to run the program, and not
Circle's central staff. Later, a letter from OEO to Circle in February
of 1973 spelled out this disagreement in the following ways:
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Table III
Circle Complex Funding Sources: 1970-1971
Component
Hill Top Day Care
Small Business Development Ctr
Circle Associates (Consulting)
Circle Associates
Afro-American Studies
Curriculum Resource Ctr
Circle Associates
Circle, Inc. (SIP)
CVCF
Circle Associates
Circle Associates
Roxbury Institute of
Business Management
Source
HEW
EDA
Ford Foundation
Newburyport School
System
Permanent Charities
Model Cities
OEO
0E0
SBA
Pittsburg Model
Cities
Charles Merril Trust
Amount
$138,705
146,800
86,150
8,500
15,000
20,000
104,000
200,000
101,000
40,000
400,000
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We feel that Circle's complex organizational structure has
been a detriment to the program. This office is unwilling
to consider refunding the program through the present
structure. A separate entity must be established to oper-
ate the SIP. . . . the Special Impact Program will no
longer bear the overhead expenses of other Circle programs.
[also] . . . more representative community participation
must be incorporated into the operation of the SIP. . . .20
This directive is quite clear in its intent. They wanted CVCF to split
off from the rest of the complex. However, the directive was not well
received by some of the key people involved with Circle.
One person felt that "changes are being proposed that I think will
unnecessarily restrict the role of Circle and ignore some of its assets,
thus jeopardizing the chances for future economic growth of the commu-
nity. ,21 The fact that the central staff of Circle, Inc., would be pos-
sibly shut out of venture development was unsettling because the coordi-
nating effort was done by Circle, while CVCF was just an affiliate invest-
ment group, and not the representative of a wide range of community
groups like Circle. The danger of losing this "unified" element was
especially troublesome to critics of OEO within Circle:
We had developed the way we had because we wanted to unite
the community by achieving some coordination among all
the community groups in the area of economic development
activity, and we wanted to be able to gain independent
financial resources for collective and united community
action. The Federal government, under president Nixon,
said they were mostly concerned about the possibility of
the mixing and mingling of funds for the various separate
sources, but I think they were equally concerned to avoid
organizational unity in the community . . .22
Not all of Circle's leadership was as concerned about the dangers of this
impact at the time because they felt that Circle, Inc., would still have
a role to play in the development process while CVCF actually adminis-
tered the SIP, especially since the two groups were still affiliated (and
structurally connected).
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Yet, in 1975, when OEO (now CSA) wanted further changes, one person
who was not as worried in 1973 expressed his feelings, and advocated possibly
not taking the CSA funding if Circle couldn't be involved.23  When faced
with the choice, the organization went along with CSA, and GRDC was created
as an autonomous entity. The other components of Circle gradually faded
away as the new organization became the primary focus of activity.
The relationship between GRDC and CSA was not always good either,
as CDS kept pressing GRDC for more grass-roots participation on its Board,
and a more successful business development record. One person complained
that CSA didn't allow more real estate development to take place. 24  The
former director stated that CSA required them to have a top heavy staff
that was not necessary, that approval for crucial deals came too late,
and that GRDC had to cope with changing priorities from Washington as a
result of CSA staff turnover and new presidential administrations. 2 5
Yet, other GRDC/Circle insiders didn't think that CSA interfered
with GRDC too much at all, that requirements and regulations were easy
enough to deal with, and that it was GRDC's internal problems (and lack of
sufficient success) that caused the main difficulty to the organization. 26
(CSA spelled out a lot of these internal factors in its defunding letter
to GRDC. Examination of this letter and interviews with significant actors
does suggest that the organization did have some internal problems.)
Since GRDC was very dependent on Title VII money, the defunding
was a severe setback to the group, although they had been warned ahead
of time. The organization lobbied against the action unsuccessfully in
early 1981. After a period of staff (and board) resignations and layoffs,
GRDC has finally stabilized and is basically living off its assets.* GRDC
* In 1981 the organization concluded that it could convert many of its
assets into cash to help the corporations financially. (GRDC figures
that it could raise as much as $265,000 from sale of assets.)
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today is a very narrow version of what the groups started out to be. Yet,
this limited focus might be crucial to its current survival.
RELATIONS WITH EXTERNAL FORCES
In most interviews and written documents, the relationship with
OEO/CSA dominates the discussion of relations outside forces. Apart from
this, the only other major difficulty mentioned is GRDC's less than positive
interaction with city officials.27 While bad relations didn't seem to
hamper the groups efforts too much, it probably did help to prevent GRDC
from getting a larger share of resources that pass through city hall.
(GRDC's reliance on federal funds made a potential loss of city funds less
important to the organization.) Present staff indicated that some of the
tension with the city has abated after the change in leadership. A former
staff member contends that GRDC should have lobbied more effectively with
local and federal actors to aid in the organization's development plans.
Another person involved with GRDC stresses that the corporation lobbied
effectively with federal officials, but was unable to deliver what it
(GRDC) had promised in proposals. Thus, bad performance really helped
to strain the relations with CSA.
Relations with private actors didn't seem to be a crucial problem,
although one source indicates that leaders weren't providing funds
promptly.29  GRDC's troubled business development track record did serve
to weaken confidence in the organization. And finally, one critic main-
tained that Circle/GRDC never had many contacts in the minority business
community, arguing that better communications might have aided the organi-
zation's business management capacity.30
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DISCUSSION
If the outcomes of Circle/GRDC's experience are measured in terms
of what the organization wanted to do in the late 1960s, then the group
has fallen far short of its original objectives. The small entrepreneur-
ial CDC that GRDC is today is much different from the federation of organiza-
tions and activities that started out. The fact that GRDC also has a non-
minority director is particularly ironic when the group began with an
emphasis on building black economic resources.
OEO/CSA's role in helping to change the organization is clear, but
it is not the only major factor that led to a changing emphasis and present
outcomes. First, Circle, Inc., may have been too ambitious in its under-
takings. It had established its various components, but some sources sug-
gest that many of the services it offered were ineffective (implying that
Circle's efforts were spread too thin or else that many staff people were
not competent enough to perform their tasks).31 Therefore, it is ques-
tionable whether the loss of these functions was that crucial to the com-
munity at large. The fact that the Circle Complex was very dependent on
outside funding (and eventually ceased to exist) meant that the early or-
ganizational goals of self-sufficiency were not nearly being approached
and were possibly unattainable for the group as structured.
Second, internal strife (and mismanagement) within GRDC seems to
be a very important influence on the organization's performance. Although
some sources argue that the Title VII program was designed poorly by the
government (and mandated a large inefficient staff), it is still clear
that a large number of problems cannot be blamed on outside interference
from CSA.*
* Some other Title VIIs have much more successful development records.
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Last, it should be mentioned that all of CSA's directives do not
necessarily have to be classified as negative to the community interest.*
Continued pressure for more grass-roots involvement was a position that
was supported by other community people connected with the organization.
Requests' for better deals were not always unreasonable, given some of the
mismanagement that took place. If the rest of the Circle complex was not
performing so well, then maybe asking that the SIP funds were used separ-
ately was not such an outlandish request.
In short, a number of people feel that Circle/GRDC needed to make
some changes in the way it operated. However, the ability of CSA to get
the organization to change (and some of the possible motives behind the
demands) are still an ominous threat to the ability of a community group
to choose a relatively "independent" course of action. Circle could have
been a much more effective group, but that would not have stopped CSA from
threatening defunding if the government was adverse to seeing a particular
power base growing from Circle's attempted coordinating efforts. Even
if the organization had more resident participation incorporated into its
efforts, CSA still had final approval over investment, and could enforce
its own priorities.
This influence can be seen further if the Title VII defunding process
is examined. GRDC ultimately had to get permission to stay in existence
because of a provision in the corporation's "Articles of Organization"
which stated that:
the property or assets of the corporation remaining
after providing for the payment of its debts and obliga-
tions shall be conveyed, transferred, distributed, and
set over outright to or as directed by the United States
Community Services Administration . 32
* Depending, of course, on how this interest is measured.
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Thus, in the case of an organizational emergency, CSA had the power to
determine what should be done with these assets.
This might be innocent enough to agency people trying to maintain
a kind of public interest (by seeing that money from assets are used for
a worthy purpose), but this provision shows that the potential for outside
influence on a community based group was (and is) very real. Despite
Circle/GRDC's problems, and some possibly honorable intentions on the part
of CSA, a degree of local independence was definitely lost in their (GRDC's)
10 year relationship with the government (although many people involved
with the organization feel that a stronger, more competent organization
would have significantly reduced this loss of independence).
CONCLUSIONS (REGARDING THE THESIS TOPIC)
The following conclusions can be drawn from the case study just
presented:
- OEO/CSA definitely had a degree of influence over the forming
of priorities and organizational structure of GRDC and its
predecessor. However (as stated previously), the influence
was apparently of a positive nature at some points and occurred
in large part because of a lack of adequate performance by
GRDC. Many former (and present) organization people (board
and staff) feel that internal (and not external) factors have
been the main difficulties in the corporation's history.
- GRDC's internal problems and an almost total dependency on
CSA increased any effects (positive or negative) that the
agency had on the organization.
- Relations with other external actors (and political forces)
have been problematic at times, but apparently not a major
factor in the organization's development.
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Other conclusions from the case study (along with the ones listed above)
will be utilized in the analysis section of Chapter V when the three CDCs
are compared.
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CHAPTER V:
ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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CONCLUSIONS FROM THE PREVIOUS CHAPTERS
In each of the three case studies presented in this report, there
have been various factors that served to constrain the strategies and ob-
jectives of community based development corporations. Part of the
limitation on organizational efforts can be attributed to actions of
external support institutions or funders. After reviewing the case studies
and related literature (in Chapter I), some of the important points con-
cerning the effects of funding (and support) groups can be summarized in
the following way:
Influence of a Funding Source:
While this study didn't identify a funding source that exerted
total dominance over a community group's priorities, it did illustrate
certain instances where the influence was keenly felt. Circle/GRDC seemed
to be the most vulnerable to outside pressure, ultimately changing many
goals and its organizational structure. Although one could argue that
some of these changes might be positive, the priorities of the funding
body still thwarted the kind of organizational independence the founders
of Circle talked about in the late 1960s. RAP appeared to be relatively
less affected by any particular funder, but was nonetheless constrained
by many related factors like program regulation and politics. LRCC came
closest to retaining its original goals, and the specific directives of
a funding body did not outwardly change the orientation of the group.
Indirect Funding: The Role of State and Federal Programs:
All of the CDCs examined were limited by the choices of available
financing vehicles. Both RAP and LRCC were forced to change their project
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plans to suit the needs of state and federal housing programs. Certain
objectives like cooperative housing and land banking were not supported
by these programs. (It is debatable whether the organizations could have
pursued these goals anyway. Some observers indicate that the CDCs just
took a much easier path by seeking rental subsidies.) LRCC has still man-
aged to come up with projects that were still fairly close to their or-
iginal objectives, since they were working with large scale backing on
an established agreement.* RAP, on the other hand, lost control of its
last project in part because of a changed program regulation at the MHFA.
As mentioned, GRDC was also limited to the traditional financing vehicles.
In addition, CSA had veto power over its deals, which further narrowed
the kinds of options available. Even when the available programs cor-
responded with the priorities of all three groups, regulations and other
by-products of the bureaucratic structure served to be a hindrance to the
organizations.
Local Resources and Local Politics:
CDCs and other groups are forced to interact with local officials
when trying to acquire land parcels, local money, permits, and all the
other elements that are part of the development process. In most cities
(some say especially Boston), there is quite often a political price tag
attached to resources and permits that City Hall controls. An adversarial
relationship with city officials can make obtaining these resources very
difficult. RAP had problems with acquiring 121a status, while GRDC might
have missed local revenue opportunities.** LRCC established more favorable
* Fairly close means that LRCC built the housing units it wanted, but
original plans were altered in a limited way.
** Part of RAP's problems stemmed from organizational inefficiency. The
next section will examine the issue of internal CDC problems further.
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contacts in local government, and was able to overcome some of the develop-
ment constraints. However, their original power was built on struggle
with the same agencies, and while cooperation with the city brought LRCC
certain returns for its immediate area, there is some question as to how
far CDCs like this should take this kind of cooperation with local govern-
ment strategy. (This question will be considered again later in the
chapter.)
Impacts of the National Political-Economy:
The political/economic environment also plays an important part
in the life of CDCs. High interest rates, changing political priorities,
and related factors can limit the efforts of CDCs trying to create housing,
businesses, and other entities that are vulnerable to exogenous shocks
in the larger system. An even greater issue, which influences all the
other elements listed above, is the political and philosophical orientation
of the institutions of power in this society. Many CDCs were seen as
alternatives to the present political/economic structure that wasn't
addressing the needs of the more vulnerable groups in the country. The
development of community corporations is tolerated as long as they remain
in certain political and philosophical bounds.
RAP was especially bold in trying to push its different vision of
Black America, but even it was forced to acknowledge the power of external
institutions by down playing its ideology at times, and also working
through white mediating groups when necessary. The experience of Title
VII and the fear of "black militant" involvement shows the real limits
of programs supposedly designed to let communities establish their own
priorities. Groups have experienced a hard time trying to set up collec-
tively controlled resources in a capitalistic "free market" system. This
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kind of overwhelming constraint cannot be overlooked.
INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS (THE OTHER CRUCIAL FACTOR)
This report has focused on the possible constraints imposed on CDCs
by external support institutions. The case studies have indicated outside
influence has been a problem for the CDCs in some instances. However,
it would be misleading to suggest that only external forces prevent an
organization from achieving its objectives. Evidence suggest that internal
effectiveness is a key element in determining how well a CDC can implement
its strategies.
It is apparent that Circle/GRDC's internal problems (and lack of
sufficient leadership) are probably the major reason for its lack of prog-
ress. In this case, internal difficulties only helped to strengthen the
influence of CSA because the organization has so many weaknesses. RAP
also has problems with internal competency which helped to prolong the
negotiations for some deals (such as RAP-UP-IIA). Some of RAP's and LRCC's
repeated submissions of site plans to the MHFA were due in part because
of mistakes made by the organizations themselves or the professionals
working for the CDCs.
It is not the purpose of this thesis to explore the problems of
CDC staff and management. However, it would be inaccurate to blame all
of the group's problems on external factors. The internal difficulties
must at least be identified so that our discussion of the influence of
funders (and others) can be examinedin the proper perspective.
INDEPENDENCE: WHAT IS POSSIBLE FOR CDCs
All through this report, there has been much discussion concerning
the desire for independent action on the part of CDCs (and presumably,
97
other community based organizations). However, this elusive quality has
never really been defined. It is obvious that CDC founders did not realis-
tically think that they could just formulate any list of priorities and
then successfully implement these objectives exactly as planned, according
to their (and nobody elses) wishes. Yet, these groups were not interested
in the opposite end of the spectrum where a community group would have
priorities imposed upon it totally from without and the resulting outcome
being a reflection of some outside goals.
Many groups wanted (especially those in the black community) more
control over strategy decisions simply because they felt that externally
imposed programs were not working, and were not in the best interest of
poor and minority communities that needed to coordinate their own resources
and talent. Therefore, a number of people felt that the most beneficial
approaches to problem solving would come if decision-making was decen-
tralized to the community level. Other activists felt that it was only
right for local residents to have more control over their own destinies.
Thus, a movement for community control was established around some of these
(and other) basic principles.
The real issue here, however, is not merely the making of decisions,
but the implementation of strategies based on these decisions. It becomes
more complicated when community people use resources that come from outside
the area, and the external entities in charge of the aid want some say
as to how these resources are used.* The independence question is even
more difficult if the strategies chosen conflict with priorities of the
of the institutions of power in the larger society.
* Although community people pay taxes, these resources have passed out
of their control and are considered external. The fact that the com-
munity through its tax paying activities, is entitled to a fair share
of these tax dollars is often overlooked in many discussions of outside
aid.
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It is certain that the early founders of the CDCs must have been
aware of these external constraints, and that they took them into consid-
eration when they formulated their objectives. Some might argue that a
few goals were overly ambitious or utopian, but most of the goals presented
in the case studies seem to reflect some degree of consideration. Because
the original CDC people took the environment into account (to a certain
extent) indicates that they believed that the independence and autonomy
they talked about were "relative" quantities, and not some hopeless dreams
of community activists high on recent victories.
However, even if "independence" is considered in a limited way,
Chapters I-IV suggest that many groups did not experience the "relative"
independence that some analysts feel is necessary to bring about real
improvement on the community level. Some groups fared better than others,
depending on their original objectives, and the resources they could pool
and coordinate to help reach these objectives. However, even the more
successful (at reaching their own goals) had to sacrifice certain
priorities.
It should be stressed that "independence" itself is not so much
an end as it is a means to make (hopefully) better choices and changes
in the community. The fact that strategies are adopted by local people
does not, by definition, necessarily make them more effective in meeting
the needs of neighborhood residents. To assume that any project a par-
ticular local organization produces is wonderful is ludicrous. There needs
to be some accountability, especially with public money, to see that some
sort of positive interest is served. Although determining this interest
is a highly subjective process, it has to take place to some degree. (The
last section in this Chapter will outline some policy recommendations.)
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Yet, given the past record of policy makers and urban programs,
it would be more ridiculous to expect a large degree of positive external
influence in terms of regulation, aid, or other resources to flow into
a community with the best interest of a community in mind. Once programs
are watered down or are made to satisfy political needs (like Title VII),
they have been hardly known to turn communities around. In addition, much
that has taken place has been a response to a wide variety of neighborhood
efforts which ranged (over the years) from letter writing to violent
protest.
In short, even if policy guidelines that might slightly limit grass-
roots decision-making are necessary, the community still needs to influence
(as much as possible) the shaping of these guidelines. This translates
into a duel strategy of pushing for both local autonomy and struggling
for better formulated guidelines for externally based aid programs. It
should be realized, however, that this requires a long-range well coordi-
nated effort.
HOW CDCs CAN COPE WITH EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
What can CDCs do in the short run to try and increase the decisions
and strategies available to them.? Chapters I-IV indicate some factors
that assist CDCs in coping better with priorities imposed on them from
outside their communities:
(1) The need for an internally strong and effective organization:
The cases and other literature suggest that groups with better
staff-board relations, greater management capability, and
clearly stated priorities tended to achieve goals more often
than other groups. An internally strong group tends to be
able to withstand outside influence more effectively since
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an external force cannot play on internal divisions to get
its way (as in the case of GRDC).
(2) The Need for an organized constituency: Clearly this factor
helped LRCC achieve most of its concessions from the city
bureaucracy. Because its constituency can provide free labor
and exert some degree of power, it is helpful if the organiza-
tion is not perceived as cut off from the residents. (However,
there are potential problems for a CDC if its constituency
chooses to remain in an adversarial relationship with City
Hall for example. These difficulties will be discussed in the
next section.)
(3) The need to establish working relations with support groups:
Certain CDCs have found their efforts aided by having contacts
in public and private institutions. If a CDC chooses to pursue
physical or economic development, this kind of access is prob-
ably necessary, unless the CDC chooses to forego this option
in favor of more constituency organizing or other means of
influence. However, carrying out an adversarial relationship
while trying to gain outside resources (or permits, land parcels,
etc.) is very troublesome over the long run since the potential
for external damage to the CDC becomes greater with this kind
of development process that requires a number of local and state
agreements in order to implement. LRCC found it profitable
to transform their adversarial relationship into a working
relationship in order to pursue the organization's objectives.
(4) The need to leverage all community based resources: While
certainly not a total solution in most cases, the use of
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grass-roots money, labor, and talent can help cut down on
the dependency on outside aid (and help to limit external
influence). Both RAP and LRCC (in varying degrees) used some
of these internal resources. In fact, most of LRCC's early
strength came from this kind of self-reliance.
(5) The need to attract other free professional and other help:
The contribution of time and effort by some outside professionals
and students has also been very helpful to the organization,
and lowered their budgetary requirements. In the past, RAP
has constantly utilized the services of pro-bono professionals
in its operations because it couldn't afford to pay additional
staff or consulting fees. However, the use of outside talent
needs to be monitored, since some organizations experienced
problems from students who made mistakes while working on
certain projects.
(6) The need for funding diversity (and possible self-sufficiency):
GRDC's basic dependence on one main source of aid left it more
vulnerable to changing agency priorities and national political
shifts. Fudning diversity might help to alleviate this problem
to a certain extent. Self-sufficiency, while not realistic
for most organizations at this point, or even desirable for
some, would still aid in the struggle for autonomy. However,
even if staff is paid from organizational resources, this does
not mean that a CDC is operating independently, since it still
has to deal with the institutions of the larger society to try
and implement development projects.
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THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CDC STRATEGY
Even if some or all of these elements are included in a CDC's
strategy, there are only a limited number of functions a CDC by itself can
perform. The constraints of the political/economic system keeps CDCs within
certain bounds through laws, regulations, plus political and economic force.
This illustrates the basic difference between the CDC and the single issue
advocacy group. The latter, quite often solely dependent on its own funds
and energy, can mount all kinds of pressure to pursue a point of interest.
By contrast, a CDC that tries to attempt such a feat repeatedly
will find a tough road to travel if it then tries to develop housing or
businesses--something which is easier prey for external forces (given the
need for outside financing). It is no secret that most CDCs have become
more conservative and less vocal over time. LRCC chose to turn community
action into working relationships with government agencies. Even RAP,
with its self-determination ideology, found it imperative to cooperate
with certain public and private actors.
Although the CDC is not "independent" enough to operate heavily
in the political arena, it can still play a limited role in this effort
(for political and social change) by informing its constituency about cer-
tain key issues (national policies, etc.) that affect the neighborhood.
CDCs themselves can organize into coalitions to push for more aid to their
own efforts. This has already occurred to some extent.
It is important for CDCs to realize that the development role they
are playing limits their strategy options (and independence). If neighbor-
hood activists put all of their energy into a particular CDC, then this
would produce problems. One author contends that CDCs are the new mediat-
ing structures between city hall (and its backers) and community residents.
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He suggests that this relationship causes the CDC and its constituents
to adopt a narrow focus on physical improvements to an immediate neighbor-
hood or block, at the expense of a more cooperative community wide (and
city wide) action around specific issues.1
CDCs AS PART OF A LARGER STRATEGY
Given the constraints on a CDC, and the "relative" nature of its
independence, there is a real need for other kinds of organizational efforts
to supplement what a CDC can do. Although some of the community leaders
might have wanted CDCs to accomplish many tasks at once, experience has
illustrated the limited nature of the decisions these groups can make.
Given these constraints, there are other types of organizations more suited
to pursuing controversial objectives over a long period of time.
Community advocacy organizations (neighborhood associations, etc.)
that are not dependent on outside support or cooperation are in a better
position to push for the more political objectives. While this fact is
basically common knowledge, it should be noted that CDCs were originally
envisioned by some as being independent enough to implement a very wide
set of priorities (economic, social, and political). Because of its con-
straints, a CDC should delegate (unofficially) certain objectives to other
groups if it (the CDC) is to retain working relations with key public and
private figures. If at all possible, strategies of various groups should
be coordinated, so that if a more vocal group engineers a change in policy,
then the less visible CDC is in a position to take advantage of any policy
change.*
In short, CDCs will have to work through the greater "independence"
* This has its dangers, since in one recent instance a Boston area CDC
was known to be affiliated with groups not favored by local government,
and the CDC was "punished" for this association. 2
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of other neighborhood structures for certain kinds of objectives that
challenge conventional methods or philosophical orientations. For ex-
ample, another community group can (as some have) "squat" in tax delin-
quent buildings and demand that they be turned over to community organ-
izations free of tax obligations. If the pressure mounted is large
enough, and concessions are made, then CDCs would be in a position to
take advantage of this opportunity for development purposes.
These policies will help CDCs in their efforts to implement
development strategies. Yet, the added effort of the other more "inde-
pendent" organizations is necessary in light of worsening economic con-
ditions (and related problems). There is a need for more vocal entities
to push for social, political, and economic change in the community and
society at large. As one person stated, "getting some jobs and buying
into the familiar politics of scarcity which encourages us to get a share
and keep quiet, will never build the changes Black folk need to see." 3
This statement can apply to all distressed communities that desire a
better existence.
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Notes to Chapter V
1. Bayard Corey Stone, Community Economic Development and Urban Poli-
tics (Unpublished undergraduate thesis, Harvard College, March
190), p. 26.
2. Sources: Interviews with Bennet Harrison of M.I.T., and Carl Sussman
of the Community Economic Development Assistance Corporation.
3. Mel King, Chain of Change: Struggle for Black Community Development,
(Boston: South End Press, 1981), p. 242.
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APPENDIX I
METHODOLOGY
Chapters II, III, and IV of this thesis presented case study
material of three organizations that offered different experiences in
community-based development. In order to compile the information for
each chapter, I conducted a series of interviews with people connected
with the CDCs in some way. This included former (and present) board mem-
bers, staff members, and informed community residents. (Most of the people
interviewed are listed in the Bibliography section.) Each person was
asked a series of questions regarding the evolution of the organizations,
and the CDC's relationship to external support groups. (See Appendix II
for a sample questionnaire.)
In addition to the interviews, I studied organizational documents
that related to the thesis topic. These documents included financial
reports, written histories, letters, memoranda, and a series of progress
reports and proposals. Most of these sources are listed in the Bibliog-
raphy section or the notes for each chapter.
Finally, any newspaper articles, books, or other reference material
to enrich the cases were utilized in this report. All of the information
sources were synthesized in an effort to present an account of the organi-
zations and their experiences. While the findings in each chapter are
not quite (totally) conclusive, the case studies do give a sufficient
indication of answers to the questions posed in this thesis. (The case
study method at best can only approximate what actually transpired in the
evolution of each organization.)
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APPENDIX II
CASE STUDY QUESTIONS
I: (BACKGROUND)
(A) 1: What are the general socio-economic characteristics of the
organization's target area? What were these conditions like
at the organization's beginning?
2: Outline the major changes that have taken place in the
neighborhood over time. Whar were the specific causes for
these changes?
(B) (Origins of the Organization)
1: How did this particular organization get started? (What
year, etc.?)
2: What was the initial structure of the organization?
3: How was the organization initially funded?
4: Was the funding unrestricted?
5: What other kinds of outside resources did the organization
make use of?
6: What were the original plans and goals of the organization?
7: What kind of popular support/community role did the
organization have at that time?
8: What kind of political relationship did the organization
have with other groups, levels of government, etc.?
II: (ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION)
(A) (Organization's Efforts & Products)
1: What were the major successes (and failures) of the organi-
zation over time?
2: What were some of the main reasons for some of the successes(and failures)?
3: Was the organization forced to change its original orien-
tation in any way? If so, why?
4: Has the structure and style of the organization changed
in any way? If so, why?
5: Does the organization react to things less and initiate
more?
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6: Has the organization's relationship with the surrounding
community improved/deteriorated? Why?
7: Has the relationship with different levels of government
changed over time? Why?
8: Have the different levels of government played an overall
positive or negative role in the history of the organization?
(B) (Initial Funding Sources)
1: What was thee organization's relationship with its initial
funding source?
2: Were restrictions initially imposed on the organization?
3: What other kinds of regulations and restrictions did
the organization have to cope with over the years?
(C) (Funding Changes Over Time)
1: Did the organization change its funding arrangement over
time?
2: How did this affect the organization's development?
3: Did a particular funding source change its priorities
over time?
4: How did this affect the organization?
5: Was there ever conflict between the priorities of the
organization and the mandate of the funding source? How
was this handled?
6: Are certain funding sources easier to work with than others?
7: Are there other kinds of restrictions/regulations that
brought difficulty to the organization?
(D) (Politics)
1: Were there complications concerning the political views/
relationships of the organization and the orientation of
the funding source?
2: If so, how was this dealt with?
3: Did this "coping" with the funding source in any way affect
the relationship of the organization to its constituency?
III: (PRESENT OUTCOMES)
(A) (Present Conditions and Directions of the Organization)
1: What are the organization's present sources of funding?
2: What is the organization's relation to the funding source?
3: What is the organization presently working on?
4: How did the organization become involved in this project?
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5: What are the higher priorities of the organization?
6: What external obstacles doe the organization face?
7: Has the organization become more independent of or more
dependent on outside resources?
8: Does the organization make use of any community funding,
voluntary labor, etc.?
9: How has this changed over time?
10: What is the organization's relationship with other organi-
zations, constituency, etc.?
11: What is its relationship with different levels of government?
IV: (FUTURE)
(A) (Organizational Direction)
1: What are the organization's long-range plans?
2: What are the future projected sources of funding?
(B) (Wishes of the Organization)
1: What kind of improvements would the organization like to see:
- In the way funds are provided
- In the way regulations are drawn up and enforced
- In the way that organizations are monitored and evaluated
- Other
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